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Abstract 
The main objective of this research is to study the way that a developing 
country could reap the benefit maximally from inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI). The key arguable point both in academic and practice is to promote the 
input-output linkage of foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) with local firms. 
The first two stages work involves the empirical study using two originally 
collected and compiled panel data sets from China. The first stage work, Study 
One, is designed to investigate the impact of FDI linkage. FDI Backward 
Linkage (the relationship between foreign producers and indigenous suppliers) 
is empirically proved to be important in promoting the development of 
indigenous Chinese manufacturing firms through both vertical and indirect 
horizontal spillovers (taking effects in the up/down stream sectors and same 
sector respectively). Subsequently, several crucial factors which are 
determinative to the creation of FDI Backward Linkage are found in Study 
Two. 
As the behaviour of foreign firms' are normally very sensitive to the host 
government policies, the third stage study is designed to investigate government 
policies or other conditions if possible under which FIES would prefer to source 
locally and impose vertical technology transfer (VTT) to local suppliers. Apart 
from the above two empirical studies, the analysis in Study Three is fulfilled by 
a two-stage dynamic game theoretical model. 
The findings have important managerial and policy implications. Briefly, a) 
self-development of indigenous firms is vital to both the creation of FDI 
Linkage and benefiting from such linkage; b) targeting foreign investors with 
higher FDI Linkage potential is an effective way for Chinese government to 
promote the development of indigenous firms; c) the after care policies to those 
established FIEs should not be neglected; d) the adjustment of the FDI policies 
needs to take into account the circumstance of the host economies. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Preamble 
At the international academic and policy-making scene the attitude 
towards inward FDI has changed considerably over the last couple of decades. 
Gone are earlier discussions on restrictive business practices, transfer pricing, 
crowding out of local business, technological dependence, unequal development 
and loss of sovereignty, which prevailed during the 1970s. Instead, most 
countries have liberalised their policies to attract investments from foreign 
multinational corporations (ININCs) since the early 1980s. In accordance with 
World Investment Report 2005 (UNCTAD, 2005), the amount of inward FDI in 
the world as a whole has reached 5648 billion until the end of 2004, among 
which around 40% were to developing countries (5233 billion); FDI outflows 
increased to S730 billion in 2004, with firms based in the developed countries 
accounting for more than 87% (S637 billion). 
Admittedly, the fundamental reason behind this trend is the globalisation 
and regionalisation of the international economy e. g. be it globally, through 
GATT and WTO, or regionally, in the form of EU, NAFTA, AFTA and other 
regional agreements. But there are also more direct explanations for the 
2 
increasing emphasis on FDI promotion in recent years. Policy makers and 
academics often believe that host economy could derive benefits from inward 
FDI. The scholarly literature on FDI is vast and has been surveyed many times 
(For recent surveys see Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003; Hanson, 2001; and Lipsey, 
2002). 
Just as Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations 
(UNCTAD, 2001b) stated, 
"Investment is of decisive importance for the developing world. The only 
developing countries that really are developing are those that have 
succeeded in attracting significant amounts of foreign direct investment". 
3 
1.2 Necessity of Current Research and the Research Objectives 
On the expectation that host economy could gain benefits from inward FDI, 
many governments have not only reduced barriers to FDI but also offered 
various special incentives to attract foreign firms. 
Policies to promote FDI take a variety of forms: fiscal incentives, such as tax 
holidays and lower taxes for foreign investors; financial incentives: such as 
government grants, credits at subsidised rates, government equity participation 
and government insurance at preferential rates. Other incentives can include 
subsidised dedicated infrastructure, subsidised services, contract preferences or 
foreign exchange privileges and even monopoly rights. To make their 
investment environments more investor friendly, host governments adopted new 
laws and regulations. For example in 1998,103 countries offered tax concessions 
to foreign invested enterprises (FIES) that set up production or administrative 
facilities within their border (Hanson, 2001). In 2004, out of 271 such changes 
pertaining to FDI introduced 235 involved steps to open up new areas to FDI 
along with new promotional measures. In addition, more than 20 countries 
lowered their income taxes on FIEs in their bid to attract more FDI (UNCTAD, 
4 
2005). 
The most popular arguments for the benefits of FDI to the host country 
include employment generation, taxation, and positive externalities, among 
which the incentives of employment generation and taxation, obviously, are not 
always reliable arguments. In an economy with unemployment, a solution to the 
problem would depend on the causes and nature of unemployment. Thus it is 
not clear whether more investment would help to solve unemployment. With 
regard to tax generation, since tax deduction even remission for FIEs is often 
utilised as an incentive policy to attract FDI by host governments, gaining 
benefits through taxation usually does not work as well. Considering the above 
two situations, a more sophisticated argument is that FDI incentives are valid 
as a way to tap the positive externalities of FDI. 
One robust finding is that FIES tend to have higher productivity than 
indigenous firms in the same sector (Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Blomstrom 
and Wolff, 1994; Kokko, Zejan and Tainsini, 2001). Thus it can be imagined 
that if the production of FIES did not negatively impact the productivity level 
of indigenous firms, in long term inward FDI would lead to a higher GDP in the 
5 
host country'. Yet if FIES paid market wages, the increased GDP would be 
completely captured by FIES, and hence long term national welfare would not 
increase. There is ample evidence, however, that FIEs do pay above market 
wages (Blomstom, 1983; Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Aitken, Harrison and 
Lipsey, 1996; Girma, Greenaway and Wakelin, 1999; Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2002) 
so that they could contribute to the increase of long term national welfare. But 
just as mentioned above, the long term national welfare would increase if the 
production of FIES did not negatively impact the productivity level of 
indigenous firms of the host country. Did FIEs have a positive impact on the 
productivity levels of indigenous firms, the host country would in long term 
benefit from inward FDI. 
Under these circumstances, there has been a growing research interest in 
exploring the existence of this type of externality (e. g. Caves, 1974; Blomstrom 
and Persson, 1983; Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Kokko, 1994,1996; Aitken and 
Harrison, 1999; Li et al. 2001; Buckley et al. 2002; Javorcik, 2004). 
Surprisingly, however, the academic findings are not optimistic. The 
1 It takes time to apply the productivity effect. 
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empirical literature has not been able to confirm the existence of positive 
externalities from FDI to host countries'. Thus there appears to be a significant 
gap between the consensus among optimistic practitioners and the ambiguous 
empirical literature regarding the importance of positive FDI externalities. 
Alfaro 8: Rodriguez-Clare (2004) argue that, so far most studies have looked for 
the presence of these productivity externalities without trying to understand 
channels or mechanisms through which they occur. This may be just the reason 
that leads to the gap. 
Based on these backgrounds, current research will mainly focus on the 
productivity externalities arising from FIEs to indigenous firms in the host 
country as a possible valid reason for subsidising FDI. The general research 
objectives are four fold: 
" To investigate the existence of productivity externalities from FIEs to 
indigenous firms of host countries and to explore channels or 
mechanisms through which they could occur; 
2 For recent surveys of empirical work, see Hanson (2001), Gorg and Strobl (2002), and 
Lipsey (2002). 
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" To discover the possible determinants of the mechanisms that could 
induce positive productivity externalities from FIEs to indigenous firms; 
" To examine the interaction between the host government and FIEs; 
" To improve the existing FDI promotion tools and policies or develop new 
ones for policy makers especially of the developing countries to 
effectively maximise their benefit from FDI in the circumstances of 
globalisation and liberalisation. 
The data set utilised for all empirical studies will be collected from China, 
which comes from the following consideration: Because of its size, China's "open 
door policy" launched twenty years ago constitutes a unique and vast 
laboratory for the study of major structural changes in China and the world 
economy. It also provides an opportunity to test the benefits and the 
shortcomings of the economic policies which have been followed by the Chinese 
authorities and identify the improvements that could be brought about to 
increase the economic positive fall-outs of Chinese economic reforms. 
Then to be consistent with the data set utilised in current research, there 
S 
come the following specific research objectives: 
a To investigate the existence of productivity externalities from FIES to 
indigenous Chinese firms in Chine, and to explore channels or 
mechanisms through which they could occur; 
" To discover the possible determinants of the mechanisms that could 
induce positive productivity externalities from FIEs to indigenous 
Chinese firms; 
" To examine the interaction between the host government and FIEs; 
" To improve the existing FDI promotion tools and policies or develop new 
ones for policy makers in China to effectively maximise the benefit 
China could reap from FDI in the circumstances of globalisation and 
liberalisation. 
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1.3 The Evolution of FDI in China 
1.3.1 Basic Patterns 
Since 1993 China has been the biggest developing FDI host country in the 
world. In fact, in 2005, China accumulated more than USD 60.3 billion in FDI 
which is equivalent to around 9.3 percent of inward direct investment worldwide 
and about 25.8 percent of the investment amount for all the developing 
countries put together. Figure 1-1 and Table 1-1 see the continuously increasing 
trend of FDI flow to China except the two years of 1999 and 2000, which are 
affected by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. 
Figure 1-1 FDI in China, 1989-2005 
Inward FDI Trend in China 
700 
° 600 - 
500 --- 
400 --------- 
300 ! 1-! ---ýý- --- 
200 : -i-ý B- j---ý p- --- 
100 -' --i------- 
0 
ce ýýp MCP ýaýo ýi Cý ýCa o00 Doti Doti oob ooh oSP ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti 
Year 
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Source: China statistical yearbook, various years, compiled by the author. 
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Table 1-1 Utilisation of FDI (1979-2005) 
Year Number of Projects 
Amount of 
Contracted FDI 
(USD 100 million) 
Amount of Actually 
Utilised FDI (USD 
100 million) 
1979-1984 3724 97.50 41.04 
1985 3073 63.33 19.5G 
1989 5779 56.00 33.93 
1990 7273 65.96 34.87 
1995 37011 912.82 375.21 
1996 24556 732.76 417.26 
1997 21001 510.03 452.57 
1998 19799 521.02 454.63 
1999 16918 412.23 403.19 
2000 22347 623.80 407.15 
2001 26140 691.95 468.78 
2002 34171 827.68 527.43 
2003 41081 1150.69 535.05 
2004 43664 1534.79 606.30 
2005 44001 603.20 
1979-2005 552942 6224.25 
Note: Data in this table come from the Ministry of Commerce. 
Source: China statistical yearbook, various years, compiled by the author. 
There are mainly three types of foreign firms in China, through which FDI 
occurs: joint ventures, cooperative enterprises, and solely foreign-owned 
enterprises (table 1-2). 
" Joint ventures refer to enterprises composed of joint investments by foreign 
companies, enterprises, and other economic organizations or individuals 
and Chinese companies, enterprises, or other economic organizations. In 
China, however, foreign parties are required to contribute at least 25 
percent of the total capital, which is higher than the 10 percent required by 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries and others. 
" Cooperative enterprises are also called "agreement-based partnership 
businesses, " since they are based on cooperative terms and conditions 
agreed upon by foreign companies, enterprises, and other economic 
organizations or individuals together with Chinese companies, enterprises, 
or other economic organizations. 
" Solely foreign-owned enterprises refer to the firms with full foreign equity. 
Before 2001, the type of solely foreign-owned enterprises was not permitted 
unless they either adopted advanced technology and equipment or exported a 
12 
majority of their products'. But after China being a member of WTO in 2001, 
these restrictions were removed, as they are contrary to their WTO 
commitments 4. As a result, solely foreign-owned enterprises replaced joint 
ventures as the most popular form of FDI in China. 
3 Sec the 1990 Detailul. Implementing Rules for the Law of the People 's Republic of China on Wholly 
Foreign-Owned Enterprises. 
4 See the 2001 Detailed Implementing Rulo+ for the Law of the People 's Republic of China on Wholly 
Foreign-Owned Enterprises. 
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1.3.2 Sources of FDI in China 
East Asia, particularly Hong Kong, is the most important origin of China's 
FDI. In 2004, Hong Kong's accumulated paid-in FDI amounted to S19 billion. 
Based on official statistical data, Taiwan is also a pivotal origin of China's FDI 
with an accumulated USD 3.1 billion in 2004. In fact, quite a few businessmen 
from Taiwan invested in mainland China via such springboards as Hong Kong, 
the Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands in order to avoid the multiple 
restrictions exerted by the incumbent Taiwan authority. Indeed, the actual 
amount of Taiwan-originated investment in mainland China may be two to 
three times the amount publicly acknowledged. Therefore, although Taiwan 
ranks as the 6"' source of FDI in mainland China in 2004, it is still looked as the 
second most important place of origin of FDI in China. In addition, Japan, the 
United States, and some developed countries in Europe have also contributed to 
FDI in China (see table 1-3 and 1-4). It is worth pointing out that renowned FIES 
from developed countries have been the primary investors in China, and they 
fund large scale capital- and technology-intensive projects. The presence of these 
FIEs, such as IBM, GE, GI\'I, Motorola, Sony, and Samsung, is particularly 
15 
significant for China since it signals the greater possibility of even more future 
foreign investment. 
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Table 1-4 Distribution of FDI by Source Country or Region (USD 10000) 
Source Country (Region) 2003 2004 
Total 5350467 6062998 
Asia 3410169 3761986 
Afghanistan 2190 
Bahrain 101 380 
Bangladesh 306 749 
Brunei 5260 9605 
nlyanmar 351 878 
Cambodia 1252 2069 
Cyprus 83 160 
Korea DPR 238 273 
Hong Kong, China 1770010 1899830 
India 1593 1948 
Indonesia 15013 10452 
Iran 55 429 
Iraq 7 549 
Israel 1573 2330 
Japan 505419 545157 
Jordan 622 937 
Kuwait 10 89 
Laos 40 425 
Lebanon 124 304 
Macao, China 41660 54639 
Malaysia 25103 38504 
Mongolia 18 15 
Oman 126 
Nepal 78 
Pakistan 343 454 
Philippines 22001 23324 
Saudi Arabia 355 701 
Singapore 205840 200814 
Republic of Korea 448854 624786 
Sri Lanka 112 526 
Syria 39 64 
Thailand 17352 17868 
Turkey 1270 745 
United Arab Emirates 6958 8565 
18 
Republic of Yemen 26 286 
Vietnam 331 114 
Taiwan, China 337724 311749 
Other Countries (Regions) in Asia 
Africa 61776 77568 
Algeria 183 206 
Benin 330 270 
Botswana 137 47 
Congo 137 
Egypt 334 396 
Gabon 12 65 
Kenya 106 
Madagascar 190 318 
Mauritius 52098 60232 
Morocco 76 97 
Namibia 391 80 
Niger 10 
Nigeria 2083 1583 
Seychelles 246 654 
Sierra Leone 2 82 
South Africa 3245 10940 
Sudan 41 
Tanzania 50 15 
Togo 210 19 
Uganda 
Zambia 109 385 
Zimbabwe 325 
Libyan 15 
Gambia 
Liberia 1124 285 
Guinea 258 
Guinea Bissau 20 110 
Cameroon 73 590 
Cape Verde 33 70 
Ghana 40 
Mali 11 
Somalia 10 
TuNiSia 60 
BurkinaFaso 98 
19 
Eritrea 40 
Other Countries (Regions) in Africa 693 110 
Europe 427197 479830 
Belgium 11059 8209 
Denmark 4282 6571 
United Kingdom 74247 79282 
Germany 85697 105848 
France 60431 65674 
Ireland 1061 456 
Italy 31670 28082 
Luxembourg 17543 2878 
Netherlands 72549 81056 
Greece 177 2819 
Portugal 415 3322 
Spain 9181 15075 
Albania 65 13 
Austria 9450 9761 
Bulgaria 234 577 
Finland 3239 2801 
Gibraltar 49 100 
Hungary 2366 4996 
Iceland 50 
Liechtenstein 229 4780 
Malta 113 73 
Monaco 188 
Norway 1861 178 
Poland 364 318 
Romania 1527 3058 
San Marino 450 
Sweden 12030 12070 
Switzerland 18134 20312 
Azerbaijan 25 230 
Belorussia 83 
Kazakhstan 70 196 
Russia 5430 12638 
Ukraine 279 1386 
Uzbekistan 15 
Yugoslavia 190 327 
Croatia 4 
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Czech 1245 3363 
Slovakia 1175 207 
Macedonia 6 14 
Kirghizia 90 248 
Armenia 359 
Lithuania 364 
Other Countries (Regions) in Europe 177 1936 
Latin America 690657 904353 
Argentina 1889 3080 
Bahamas 8787 4800 
Barbados 2446 3129 
Belize 1990 1033 
Bolivia 290 134 
Brazil 1671 3070 
Cayman Islands 86604 204258 
Chile 801 339 
Colombia 47 10 
Costa Rica 2 
Cuba 1407 100 
Dominica 35 
Dominica Rep. 307 114 
Ecuador 53 10 
Honduras 69 539 
Jamaica 10 360 
Mexico 555 2129 
Nicaragua 120 
Panama 3283 3592 
Paraguay 60 830 
Peru 90 445 
Puerto Rico 10 
El Salvador 34 7 
Suriname 243 1629 
Turks and Caicos Islands 57 127 
Venezuela 128 
Virgin Islands 577696 673030 
St. Kitts-Nevis 1400 1057 
SaintVincent &Grenadines 127 
Other Countries (Regions) in Latin America 610 367 
North America 516135 497759 
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Canada 56351 61387 
United States 419851 394095 
Bermuda 39820 42277 
Other Countries (Regions) in North America 113 
Oceanic and Pacific Islands 173119 197437 
Australia 59253 66263 
Cook Islands 251 637 
Fiji 76 
Nauru 258 700 
New Zealand 6577 11528 
Papua New Guinea 45 400 
Solomon Is. 30 
Tonga 81 41 
Samoan 98572 112885 
Kiribati 110 30 
Marshall Islands 1102 1543 
East Samoan 1252 
Palau 5158 34 
Other Pacific Islands 1247 1808 
Other Countries (Regions) in Oceanic 465 210 
Others 71414 144065 
Note: The "Others" item of foreign other investment includes the stock issued in foreign 
countries at the same year. 
Source: Compiled from China Statistical Yearbook 1996-2005, National Bureau of Statistics of 
China 
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1.3.3 Distribution of FDI in Various Chinese industries 
More than 80 percent of FDI in China is Greenfield investments, and most 
FDI is in the manufacturing industry. In 2005, FDI in manufacturing industry 
constituted 65 percent of total FDI projects, and 70 percent of the actually 
utilised amount of FDI in China. In the services sector, FDI is mainly poured 
into the real estate industry. The investment in the primary industry occupies a 
rather low proportion of the total investment amount (table 1-5). A majority of 
FDI has gone into the manufacturing industry because China possesses a 
competitive edge thanks to its lower costs of production and relatively powerful 
ability to supply supporting parts. In contrast, China has strictly controlled 
the flow of FDI into the services sector for a long period. 
T 
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Table 1-5 FDI by Sector (2005) 
Actually 
Number of Increase Utilized Value Increase than 
Sector Projects than Last 
(USD 100 Last Year (%) 
(unit) Year 
million) 
Total 44001 0.8 603.2 -0.5 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
1058 -6.4 7.2 -35.5 Husbandry and Fishing 
Mining 252 -9.7 3.5 -34.0 
Manufacturing 28928 -4.8 424.5 -1.3 
Production and Distribution 390 -14.3 13.9 22.7 
of Electricity, Gas and Water 
Construction 457 11.2 4.9 -36.5 
Transport, Storage and Post 734 15.1 18.1 42.4 
Information Transmission, 
Computer Services and 1493 -8.0 10.1 10.7 
Software 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 2602 53.1 10.4 40.4 
Hotel and Restaurants 1207 2.8 5.6 -33.4 
Financial Intermediation 40 -7.0 2.2 -13.0 
Real Estate 2120 20.0 54.2 -8.9 
Leasing and Business Services 2981 12.0 37.5 32.6 
Scientific Research, Technical 
Service and Geologic 926 47.2 3.4 15.8 
Prospecting 
Management of Water 
Conservancy, Environment and 139 -15.2 1.4 -39.3 
Public Facilities 
Services to Households and 
329 31.1 2.6 64.6 
Other Services 
Education 51 -13.6 0.2 -53.8 
Health, Social Security and 
22 4.8 0.4 -55.1 Social Welfare 
Culture, Sports and 
272 0 3.1 -31.8 Entertainment 
Public Management and Social 
0.04 105.6 
Organization 
Source: Compiled from China Statistical Yearbook 2006, National Bureau of 
Statistics of China 
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1.3.4 Distribution of FDI by Host Region 
FDI in Chine, started in the four special economic zones in 1979-1980, and 
gradually extended to other coastal areas and inland areas. As we can see in table 
1-6, FDI distribution by host region varies and eastern coastal area' dominates. 
By 2003, five east coastal provinces (Guangdong, Jiangsu, Fujian, Shandong, 
and Shanghai) occupied more than 60 percent of the total cumulative FDI. 
Eastern coastal area includes: north part of eastern coastal area (Liaoning, Hebei, 
Beijing, Tianjin, and Shandong); middle part of eastern coastal area. (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
and Shanghai); south part of eastern coastal area (Guangdong , 
Guangxi, Hainan, and 
Fujian). 
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Table 1-6 Distribution of FDI by Host Region (USD 1 Million) 
Region 
2002 
Amount (USD 
million) 
Share (%) 
2003 
Amount 
(USD 
million) 
Share (%) 
National Total 52742.86 100.00 53504.67 100.00 
Jiangsu 10189.60 19.32 10563.65 19.74 
Guangdong 11334.00 21.49 7822.94 14.62 
Shandong 4734.04 8.98 6016.17 11.24 
Shanghai 4272.29 8.10 5468.49 10.22 
Zhejiang 3076.10 5.83 4980.55 9.31 
Liaoning 3411.68 6.47 2824.10 5.28 
Fujian 3838.37 7.28 2599.03 4.86 
Beijing 1724.64 3.27 2191.26 4.10 
Jiangxi 1081.97 2.05 1612.02 3.01 
Hubei 1426.65 2.70 1568.86 2.93 
Tianjin 1581.95 3.00 1534.73 2.87 
Hunan 900.22 1.71 1018.35 1.90 
Hebei 782.71 1.48 964.05 1.80 
Henan 404.63 0.77 539.03 1.01 
Hainan 511.96 0.97 421.25 0.79 
Guangxi 417.26 0.79 418.56 0.78 
Sichuan 555.83 1.05 412.31 0.77 
Anhui 383.75 0.73 367.20 0.69 
Shaanxi 360.05 0.68 331.90 0.62 
Heilongjiang 355.11 0.67 321.80 0.60 
Chongqing 195.76 0.37 260.83 0.49 
Shanxi 211.64 0.40 213.61 0.40 
Jilin 244.68 0.46 190.59 0.36 
Inner Mongolia 177.01 0.34 88.54 0.17 
Yunnan 111.69 0.21 83.84 0.16 
Guizhou 38.21 0.07 45.21 0.08 
Qinghai 47.26 0.09 25.22 0.05 
Gansu 61.21 0.12 23.42 0.04 
Ningxia 22.00 0.04 17.43 0.03 
Xinjiang 18.99 0.04 15.34 0.03 
Tibet 
Source: Compiled from China Statistical Yearbook 2005, National Bureau of 
Statistics of China. 
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Throughout the reform period, the share of the eastern region always 
remained at the level of over 85 percent of actual investment and only 
underwent a minor decrease compared to the early 1980s. The share of the 
central region saw a modest increase, rising from 1.12 percent in 1983 to 4.02 
percent in 1990 and further to 9.17 percent in 1999. In comparison, the share 
of the western region suffered a significant decrease, dropping from 5.59 
percent in 1983 to 3.75 percent in 1993 and further to 3.03 percent in 1999. 
This huge disparity between the eastern coastal area and the inland area 
could attribute to the long dominated export-oriented FDI in China, which 
will be discussed in section 1.3.5. 
Although the broad regional pattern of FDI basically remained 
unchanged, the distribution within the East has witnessed some important 
changes. In the early period of 1979-1982, FDI was concentrated on the 
four special economic zones (especially, Shenzhen). The actual investment 
in these four cities accounted for about 70 percent of the national total. All 
these four cities lie in the south coastal areas. After 1984, this concentration 
gradually decreased. While the actual investment share of the south coastal 
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area decreased from a peak level of 81.7 percent in 1984 to 59.3 percent in 
1991 and further to 38.8 percent in 2000, the share of the north coastal area 
increased from 7.1 percent in 1984 to 22.9 percent in 1991 and then 
decreased to 21.2 percent in 2000, and the central coastal area increased 
from 8.0 percent in 1984 to 10.3 percent in 1991 and further to 27.8 percent 
in 2000. Jiangsu saw an especially fast growth of foreign capital inflow. 
From 1994 on Jiangsu replaced Shanghai as the second largest recipient of 
FDI. In contrast, Shanghai saw a big fluctuation of investment. One 
reason is that while much of investment in Shanghai was directed at 
speculative real estate, investment in Jiangsu was mainly concentrated in 
manufacturing industry. For a detailed discussion and related data, see the 
FDI research group of IOIE of CASS (2000) as well as China Foreign 
Economic and Trade Statistical Yearbook (various years). 
1.3.5 Dominant Type of FDI in China 
From the aspect of market orientation, as concerned before, FDI can be 
divided into two categories: In "domestic-market seeking" investment, investors 
seek to enter the host country's local market. In "export-oriented" or 
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"efficiency-pursuing" investment, investors establish production bases in the 
host country but export most of their products to the global market. 
In China, process trade i. e. export-oriented FDI has long been the dominant 
type of FDI. 
After a lapse of 25 years, in 2003 China ranked 4th among other countries in 
the world's international trade chart, which was a major improvement from its 
32nd rank in 1978. China's rapid rise as a trading power has been considered a 
global economic miracle, and FDI has played a crucial role in developing China's 
foreign trade. 
Table 1-7 displays the development of China's foreign trade as well as the 
export and import performance of FIEs. As illustrated in the table, the export 
value registered by FIES made up only 1.9 percent of China's total export value 
in 1986, but had climbed up to 58.3 percent in 2005. Between 1986 and 2005, 
FIEs contributed up to 58.8 percent to China's total increase of export and 62 
percent to its increase of import value. 
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1.3.6 Preview of China's FDI Policies 
For the last 25 years, Chinese government has aggressively shaped a 
relatively complete range of laws and regulations governing foreign investment, 
which include the Law of the People's Republic of China upon Foreign Wholly 
Owned Enterprises, Law of the People's Republic of Chine, upon Sino-Foreign 
Joint Ventures, Law of the People's Republic of China upon Sino-Foreign 
Cooperative Enterprises, and the Guiding Directory on Industries Open to 
Foreign Investment. China's laws and regulations on FDI also include related 
preferential policies and stipulations for special . economic zones 
in the country. 
In a nutshell, China encourages favourable FDI policies. Therefore, FIEs 
enjoy preferential treatment when compared to domestic enterprises. In fact, 
FIES are entitled to markedly different treatments depending on the region and 
industry, and this differential treatment is outlined by policies. Furthermore, the 
Chinese government has stipulated different FDI performance requirements 
depending on these distinctions. 
China has designated certain parts of the country as special economic areas 
and each is governed by different policies. Chine, has also enforced two policies 
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called Develop China's West at Full Blast and Strategy of Reviving Rusty 
Industrial Bases to encourage FDI into its western and northeast regions. 
Therefore, FDI policies in China's western region entitle foreign enterprises to 
even more preferential treatment than in other regions of the country. 
The Chinese government pays much attention to industrial guidance on 
FDI. In June 1995, China first promulgated the Provisional Regulations upon 
Guidance for Foreign Investment Orientations and the Guiding Directory on 
Industries Open to Foreign Investment. Furthermore, the different preferential 
treatments granted to enterprises in various industries have mainly been 
determined under the Guiding Directory. This Guiding Directory was revised 
first in December 1997, and then again in April 2002 because of China's 
accession to the WTO. The Guiding Directory is important because it divides 
FDI-involved projects into four categories: projects that were encouraged, 
allowed, restricted, and prohibited. These categories are then subdivided even 
further. For instance, 262 types of encouraged projects, 75 types of restricted 
projects, and 34 types of prohibited projects exist. 
China currently encourages FDI for the purposes of (NDRC, 2004) 
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" transforming traditional agriculture, developing modern agriculture, and 
promoting the industrialization of agriculture; 
" producing transportation infrastructure, energy sources, and raw ma- 
terials, and other basic industries; 
0 tapping into cutting-edge, technology-oriented industries such as electronic 
information, bioengineering, new materials, and aviation and aerospace, as 
well as establishing local R&D centres; 
0 encouraging foreign businesses to utilize advanced and applicable tech- 
niques to transform traditional industries such as machinery, textiles, and 
consumption goods manufacturing industries as well as to upgrade their 
equipment and facilities; 
0 using raw and renewable resources comprehensively, initiating envi- 
ronmental protection projects, and modernizing public utilities; 
" encouraging export-oriented FDI projects; and 
" building up the industries in China's western region. 
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1.4 Research Process 
The research process flow chart (Figure 1-2) shows how the study is 
conducted, the objective of each stage, the research methodologies, samples 
applied, and outcomes of each stage. 
The research is conducted in three stages. The main purpose of Stage One is 
to initially investigate the existence of productivity externalities that 
indigenous Chinese firms benefit from inward FDI, and then try to explore the 
channels or mechanisms through which they occur. Unmasking the possible 
spillover mechanisms in this stage is a vital basis to the following study of Stage 
Two and Stage Three. 
Based on the findings in Stage One of FDI backward linkage (the 
relationship between foreign producers and indigenous suppliers) being the 
most important FDI spillover channel to benefit indigenous Chinese firms 
vertically and indirect-horizontally (taking effect in the up/down stream sectors 
and the same sectors respectively), the following stage will focus on the within 
impellent forces of FIEs' backward linkage creation in China. Accordingly, 
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Stage Two investigated the determinants of FIES' backward linkage creation 
(local sourcing decision) from the angle of foreign firms' within characteristics. 
Several determinative factors of FDI backward linkage are revealed in this stage. 
These findings will be instructive in formulating the FDI attracting policies. 
Different from the empirical studies in the above two stages, the last stage 
work tries to investigate how the host government policies could make an 
influence on FIEs' sourcing choice. It develops a two-stage dynamic game 
theoretical model to consider how a FIE makes the choice between importing 
and local sourcing, with the interaction to the host government policies focusing 
on the creation of FDI Linkage. 
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Figure 1-2 Research Process Flow Chart 
Stage One JJ Stage Two Stage Three 
Objectives To investigate To investigate the To discover 
the existence of determinants of how a foreign 
productivity FDI Backward firm makes the 
externalities of Linkage decision of 
FDI, and try to local sourcing 
explore the with the 
mechanisms interaction to 
through which the host 
they occur government. 
Sample Firm-level panel Firm-level panel None 
data with 5517 data with 1347 (theoretical 
observations observations model) 
Methodology Panel data fixed Panel data Tyco-stage dynamic 
effect model two-step fixed game of complete 
with White's 
II 
effect estimation but imperfect 
correction procedure 
information 
Outcome Confirmed Tested Suggested 
existence of determinants of policies for 
productivity foreign firms' FDI Linkage 
spillover and the local sourcing promotion and 
importance of decisions theoretical 
FDI Backward support to 
Linkage Stage One 
Consolidation of findings 
To improve existing FDI promotion 
tools and policy or develop new ones 
to maximise the benefits from 
inward FDI to China. 
36 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is presented in five chapters. This chapter introduces and lays 
the foundations for the whole three stage research. It presents the background 
and necessity of the research and outlines the important practical value of the 
study before moving on to the topic area where the research was conducted. 
Chapter 2 empirically investigates the existence of productivity 
externalities that indigenous Chinese firms benefit from inward FDI, and then 
tries to explore the channels or mechanisms through which they occur. The 
findings of FDI Backward Linkage being the most important FDI spillover 
channel to benefit indigenous Chinese firms provide a key clue to the 
subsequent study of Stage Two and Stage Three. 
After confirming the positive impact of FDI Backward Linkage, Chapter 3 
examines the determinants of such linkage from the angle of FIEs' within 
characteristics. 
Different from the empirical studies in the above two chapters, Chapter 4 
develops a two-stage dynamic game theoretical model to simulate the 
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interaction between FIEs and the host government, while focuses on how a FIE 
makes the choice between importing and local sourcing. 
The last chapter presents a discussion of the implications of the findings in 
this research and self critique along with conclusions and recommendations. 
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1.6 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the background, necessity, objectives, 
rationality and structure of the research. The preamble offered a background 
and justification for the study. The research necessity was stated in 
combination with the objectives of this study. In addition, an overview of the 
research process and structure was presented with supporting rationale. Next 
chapter will introduce the work done in Stage One of current research. 
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Chapter 2 Foreign-Local Firin Linkages and Productivity Spillovers in Chinese 
Manufacturing 
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2.1 Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) theory suggests that Foreign Invested 
Enterprises (FIEs) can generate productivity spillovers to indigenous firms in 
host countries. Accordingly, there has been a growing interest in exploring the 
existence of this type of externality (e. g. Caves, 1974; Blomstrom and Persson, 
1983; Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Kokko, 1994,1996; Aitken and Harrison, 
1999; Li et al. 2001; Buckley et al. 2002; Javorcik, 2004). However, as Alfaro L, 
Rodriguez-Clare (2004) argue, so far most studies have looked for the presence 
of these productivity externalities without trying to understand channels or 
mechanisms through which they occur. In other words, empirical studies have 
focused on finding indirect evidence of externalities by investigating whether an 
increase in the presence of FIEs is associated with an increase in indigenous 
firms' productivity in the same or upstream sectors. 
A relatively small number of empirical studies have examined horizontal or 
vertical productivity spillovers from FIEs to local firms (Schoors & van der Tol, 
2001; Görg and Ruane, 2000,2001; Driffield et 11,2002; Blalock & Gertler, 
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2003; Javorcik, 2004). Their results are not very optimistic and the crucial 
issue is that it is difficult to find evidence of positive externalities from FIEs to 
indigenous firms in the same sector (horizontal spillovers). In fact, some of 
these studies find evidence of negative horizontal spillovers arising from 
multinational activity while confirming the existence of positive externalities 
via backward linkage between FIEs and indigenous firms in upstream 
industries (vertical spillovers) (Driffield et al. 2002; Javorcik 2004). Although 
these studies shed some light on the widely accepted mechanisms or channels 
for productivity externalities, it is believed that the existing measure of FDI 
Backward Linkage is problematic due to two unrealistic implicit assumptions 
behind and that an important mechanism, i. e. "indirect horizontal 
externalities"', is ignored in empirical investigations. 
This study aims to assess the relationship between productivity spillovers 
and foreign-local firm linkages using firm level panel data in Henan Province, 
China from 1999 to 2003. The unique features of this study include (1) an 
application of an improved measure of FDI Backward Linkage; (2) an 
6 Briefly speaking, indigenous firms benefit from FIES in the same industry but through indirect 
channel. Further illustration will be provided in the following section. 
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introduction of indirect horizontal externalities; and (3) an assessment of the 
impact of local firms' ownership and trade orientation on the effectiveness of 
productivity spillovers. The results suggest that FDI in China generates 
positive vertical and indirect horizontal spillovers via FDI Backward Linkage, 
but negative general horizontal externalities. In other words, through the 
creation of FDI Backward Linkage indigenous Chinese firms both in the upper 
stream sectors as suppliers and those in the same sector as competitors could 
benefit from the presence of FDI, although at the same time local Chinese firms 
might suffer as well from the competition with FIEs, which often overweighs the 
positive FDI spillovers. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews 
the relevant literature and provides my arguments. Section 2.3 gives an 
overview of spillover mechanisms. Section 2.4 presents the dataset employed. 
Section 2.5 states the empirical model and methodology. Section 2.6 describes 
estimation results. The last section concludes the main findings and discusses 
policy implications. 
43 
2.2 Brief Review of Recent Empirical Literature 
FIEs can have a significant impact on the productivity levels of indigenous 
firms, and the possible channels or mechanisms of such externalities are 
comprehensively reviewed by Blomström and Kokko (1998), Saggi (2002) and 
Görg and Greenaway (2004). However, empirical evidence on whether FDI 
generates positive externalities for host countries is still ambiguous. Although 
the picture is usually optimistic for industrialized countries (see Gorg & Strobel 
2002; Haskel et al. 2002)', the results for developing countries are generally 
pessimistic. Many studies either fail to detect the presence of positive horizontal 
productivity externalities or actually find evidence of negative horizontal 
externalities in developing countries. For instance, Gorg and Strobl (2002) show 
that only two studies for industrialized countries and none for developing 
countries report positive evidence for intra-industry externalities; all other 
studies using panel data find either negative or no statistically significant 
effects. 
7 The evidence for industrialized countries tends to be more promising. Haskel, Pereira and 
Slaughter (2002) give convincing evidence of positive FDI spillovers taking place in the UK. 
Also Gorg and Strobl (2002) find that foreign presence reduces exit and encourages entry by 
domestic-owned firms in the high-tech sector in Ireland. 
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More encouraging results for developing or transitional countries are 
provided in some very recent studies on vertical externalities of FDI. Using a 
panel dataset of Indonesian manufacturing establishments from 1988 to 1996, 
Blalock and Gertler (2003) find evidence of positive vertical externalities. They 
also find that downstream FDI increases output and firm value added while 
decreasing prices and market concentration. Similarly, using plant level data for 
manufacturing firms in Mexico from 1993 to 2000, Lopez-Cordova (2003) finds 
that foreign capital improves total factor productivity (TFP), with positive 
inter-industry externalities prevailing over a negative intro, industry effect. 
Using firm level panel data for Lithuania from 1996 to 2000, Javorcik (2004) 
examines whether the productivity of indigenous firms is correlated with the 
presence of FIEs in downstream sectors (potential customers). Her empirical 
results indicate the existence of productivity externalities from FDI taking 
place through contacts between FIEs and their indigenous suppliers in 
upstream sectors but there is no indication of externalities occurring within the 
same industry. 
The conclusion that emerges from the empirical literature so far is that it is 
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difficult to find robust evidence of positive externalities from FIEs to 
indigenous firms in the same sector (horizontal spillovers), while there exist 
positive externalities from FIEs to indigenous firms in upstream industries 
(vertical spillovers). One possible explanation for this situation is that 
"researchers have been looking for FDI spillovers in the wrong place. Since FIEs 
have an incentive to prevent information leakage that would enhance the 
performance of their local competitors, but at the same time might want to 
transfer knowledge to their local suppliers, spillovers from FDI are more likely 
to be vertical rather than horizontal in nature" (Javorcik, 2004) 
Although these cited and some other studies help shed light on some general 
channels or mechanisms with which productivity spills over from foreign to 
local firms, the widely used measure of FDI Backward Linkage still may lead to 
biased results, and that one important mechanism, Indirect Horizontal 
Externality, identified in the theoretical model developed by Rodriguez-Clare 
(1996) is still ignored in any empirical study. This study attempts to resolve 
these two problems. 
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2.3 Spillover Mechanisms 
There are different mechanisms through which FDI can generate positive 
productivity externalities. 
2.3.1 Mechanisms of Vertical Spillovers 
As stated by Javorcik (2004), vertical spillovers can operate through three 
ways. (1) Direct knowledge transfer from foreign customers to local suppliers. 
Numerous case studies indicate (see e. g. 'Moran 2001, Altenburg 2000) that 
FIES often provide technical assistance to their suppliers in order to raise the 
quality of their products or facilitate innovation. They help suppliers with 
management training and organisation of the production process, purchasing 
raw materials and even finding additional customers. (2) Higher requirements 
regarding product quality and on-time delivery introduced by FIEs, which 
provide incentive to domestic suppliers to upgrade their production 
management or technology. (Alverez 2002) (3) Indirect knowledge transfer 
through movement of labour. (UNCTAD 2001a) 
In their theoretical model, Lin and Saggi (2004) argue that FDI can affect 
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the degree of backward linkages in two conflicting ways. On one hand, it creates 
demand for intermediate goods (demand effect), whilst on the other hand, local 
firms competing with foreign firms may be forced to reduce their output and 
hence reduce their own demand for these intermediate goods (competition 
effect). If the competition effect exceeds the demand effect, there will be net 
negative backward linkage effects. Dolan and Humphrey (2000), Weatherspoon 
and Reardon (2003) and Dries and Swinnen (2004) also provide some anecdotal 
evidence that there are negative spillovers from backward linkages in 
developing countries as local suppliers cannot comply with the higher standards 
and grading requirements for the supplied products. 
Following the theoretical discussion, an ideal measure of FDI Backward 
Linkage is a share of an indigenous firm's output that is sold to FIES, but this 
information is usually not available in most data sets except through some kind 
of surveys. Instead, almost all FDI linkage studies measure backward linkage as 
follows. Suppose we need to measure sector j's backward linkage, then 
Foreign 
_O 
UTP UT,., 
Backward,, _ (ajkt `E' ) (2.1) 
if$j 
>OUTPUT, 
iEj 
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This measure proxies the share of an indigenous firm's output sold to FIEs 
with the share of the sector's (to which the indigenous firm belongs) output 
that is sold to FIEs. ask, is the proportion of sector j's output consumed by 
sector k at year t; Foeign_OUTPUT, is the output of firm i if the firm is 
multinational, and zero otherwise; ouTTPU/;, is the output of firm i at year t. 
The amount that firms in sector j purchase from each of the other sectors can 
be calculated through 10 matrix of year t. The share of output in sector j 
that is produced by FIEs can be calculated through the data set. If a firm's 
share of a sector's use of a particular input is assumed to be equal to the output 
share, then the measure of the share of a sector's output sold to FIEs is the sum 
of the output shares purchased by other sectors multiplied by the share of 
foreign output in each sector. ' 
This measure of FDI Backward Linkage is widely applied, but its two 
implicit crucial assumptions are neglected in most linkage studies. (1) There is 
no difference in the production procedure between FIEs and indigenous firms in 
the same sector. (2) All inputs of the investigated firms are sourced from the 
8 See Blalock & Gertler 2003; Javorcik 2004; Lopez-Cordova 2003. 
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host country rather than from imports. Obviously, these two assumptions are 
unrealistic. As stated in the 2001 World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2001a), 
(1) FIES normally hold higher producing technology than local firms in 
developing countries, thus much difference exists in their producing procedure; 
(2) Many FIEs import inputs from the world market rather than source locally, 
thus this measure of backward linkage may induce severe estimation bias. 
Therefore, an alternative measure will be developed in the next section. 
2.3.2 Mechanisms of Horizontal Spillovers 
According to the Economic Survey of Europe 2001 (ESE, 2001), FDI 
horizontal intra-industry spillovers occur in three ways. First, competition with 
FIEs can increase intra-industry spillovers by stimulating technical change and 
technological learning. Greater competitive pressure faced by local firms may 
force them to introduce new products to defend their market shares and adopt 
new management methods to increase productivity. It is usually called the 
"stimulus effect". Second, human capital may spill over from FIEs to other 
firms if skilled employees move between employers, which can be called the 
"human capital effect". Finally, the proximity of local firms to FIEs can 
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sometimes lead to demonstration or imitation spillovers, which is usually called 
the "demonstration effect". When FIEs introduce new products, processes and 
organizational forms, they provide a demonstration of increased efficiency to 
other local firms. A similar classification is stated separately in the research by 
Kokko (1994), Perez (1997), Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) and Javorcik (2004). 
Fosfuri et al. (2001) also give detailed explanations on the "human capital 
effect": there is evidence that FIEs undertake substantial efforts in the 
education of local workers (Lindsey, 1986; Ritchie, Zhuang and Whitworth, 
2001) and that FIEs offer more training to technical workers and managers 
than do local firms (Chen, 1983; Gershenberg, 1987). Given that a large part of 
this labour training is not paid for by workers and constitutes knowledge that is 
not completely firm specific, this generates a positive externality, leading to 
higher wages for these workers and/or higher productivity for firms that hire 
these workers after they leave the FIEs. In general, these labour training 
externalities would show up as "horizontal" knowledge spillovers, in the sense 
that they would benefit other firms in the same sector. Something very similar 
happens if workers increase their knowledge not through formal labour training 
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but through on-the-job training, learning by doing or learning by observing. 
The spillover can also take place through "spin-off'. These are cases where 
workers leave FIEs to set up their own firms and benefit from the knowledge 
they gained while at the FIEs. 
In addition, Rodriguez-Clare (1996) described an entirely different 
mechanism for FDI horizontal externalities, and here it is called "indirect 
horizontal externalities". In contrast to knowledge spillovers, he discusses the 
pecuniary externalities that take place through market transactions. In his 
model, FIES' demand for inputs in upstream sectors may lead to the production 
of a large variety of intermediate goods. Thanks to the benefits of specialization, 
these improved inputs generate an increase in productivity for downstream 
domestic producers (positive horizontal productivity spillover). In other words, 
this allows the economy to gain a comparative advantage in the production of 
more sophisticated final goods or lowers production costs. Finally, the economy 
ends up with higher productivity and higher wages. Thus FDI Backward 
Linkage can also entail a positive indirect horizontal productivity externality. 
The relationship between backward linkage, forward linkage, horizontal 
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externality and indirect horizontal externality can be illustrated by the 
following schematic diagram: 
Figure 2-1 Mechanism System of Productivity Spillovers from FDI 
Domestic Firm Foreign Firm 
Domestic Firm 
_ _""_ý_ 
Foreign Firm 
Up Stream 
Sector 
Sector 
Investigated 
Domestic Firm Foreign Firm Down stream 
Sector 
............... 
---4 
Indirect Horizontal Externality 
Horizontal Externality 
Backward Linkage 
Forward Linkage 
Of course indirect horizontal externalities can also be negative. As Alfaro 
and Rodriguez-Clare (2003) explain, "It could occur, if FIEs behave as enclaves, 
by importing all their inputs and restricting their local activities to hiring 
labour. In this case, demand for inputs decreases as FIEs increase in importance 
relative to indigenous firms and this leads to a reduction in input variety and 
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specialization. This would show up as a negative horizontal externality"'. 
Although there is some theoretical discussion, the effect of indirect horizontal 
externalities has not been considered in any previous empirical studies. 
The following sections will provide an alternative measure of FDI Backward 
Linkage which does not rely on the two unrealistic assumptions thus is believed 
to be able to correct the measurement error mentioned above, and incorporate 
indirect horizontal externalities into the spillover mechanism system illustrated 
in figure 1 to analyse the effect of FDI on the productivity of local firms in 
Chinese manufacturing for the period 1999-2003. 
Note that in this argumentation it is a key issue that FIEs displace indigenous firms from the 
market: this could be resulted from labour market constraints (in this case of exports) or the 
competition between FIEs and indigenous firms in the host market, as discussed by Markusen 
and Venables (1999). 
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2.4 Data Description 
The firm level data set used in this study is from the Annual Survey of All 
State-owned Enterprises and Other Firms with Their Sales Being More Than 
Five Million Yuan1°, conducted by Henan Statistical Bureau of China. Henan 
ranked 14"' in 2003/2004 and 13"' in 2005 on the total amount of FDI utilised 
overall 31 provinces in China, thus its FDI status is very close to the average 
level of China". The survey coverage is extensive, as the firms included in the 
sample accounted for more than 70 percent of output in each sector. Since this 
study focuses on manufacturing only, the sample constitutes unbalanced data 
covering firms in 36 two-digit industries during the period 1999-2003. 
For each industry, the Bureau collects detailed data on each industrial firm 
that continues in operation as a going concern. The data include information on 
ownership classification, sales, employment, inventories, fixed assets, intangible 
assets, intermediate inputs cost, imports and exports. Due to entry and exit 
10 The rationale for focusing on large firms is that it is these firms which are generally perceived 
to be "leaders" in the industry and are likely to have the greatest influence on the local 
economy. 
" The author has tried to involve data from more other representative provinces, but the data 
availability in those areas is not good enough to proceed the analysis necessary in current 
research. 
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and ownership restructuring, the number of firms in operation varies over time 
from a low of one thousand in 1999 to a high of one thousand and two hundred 
in 2003, of which 37% are FIES and 63% are indigenous firms. A firm has been 
defined to be domestically-owned if its foreign equity participation, if any, is 
below 25%12. To focus on the performance of indigenous firms, the full sample 
data set is divided into two sub-samples, indigenous firms and foreign firms. 
The data are cleaned via extensive checks for nonsense observations, 
outliers, coding mistakes and the like. In addition, only firms with at least three 
years of data for ownership classification, fixed assets, intermediate inputs cost, 
employment and total sales are kept. The final data set includes a panel of 463 
foreign-invested and 785 domestically-owned firms in 36 sub-sectors in Chinese 
manufacturing in 2003.13 Detailed sample distribution can be found in Table 2-1. 
12 The definition of domestically-owned firm varies in the literature. But the 25% cut-off is 
officially defined by Chinese government. 
u The downside of this data set is that the short duration of the panel makes it more difficult 
to detect the presence of spillovers. Extending the panel to earlier years would not mitigate this 
problem because of limited FDI presence during the early 1990 s. 
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Table 2-1 Brief Description of the Sample by Sectors and by Years 
Sectors 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Oil S: Gas Exploration 15 17 15 13 15 
Nonferrous Mining 11 17 17 17 17 
Non-metal alining 33 34 33 33 33 
Agricultural &; Food Processing 30 37 37 30 30 
Food Manufacturing 81 84 85 81 81 
Drink Manufacturing 27 64 67 67 67 
Tobacco Manufacturing 22 27 25 22 22 
Textile 10 50 53 57 50 
Garment 76 86 83 85 86 
Leather & Feather Product 24 24 28 24 24 
WVood Processing 36 37 34 36 36 
Furniture Manufacturing 17 37 37 32 37 
Paper Manufacturing 6 16 16 12 16 
Printing 19 19 14 15 19 
Educational Product Manufacturing 12 12 12 12 12 
Oil Processing 7 11 13 11 11 
Chemical Product 8 12 18 18 18 
Pharmaceuticals 68 64 68 6S 68 
Chemical Fabric Manufacturing 33 33 37 33 33 
Rubber Product 11 68 64 68 68 
Plastic Product 26 16 16 13 16 
Non-metal Ming Product 14 44 44 42 44 
Black Metal making 72 72 71 71 72 
Nonferrous Metal making 25 25 21 21 25 
metal Product 19 49 49 44 49 
General Facility Manufacturing 15 15 15 14 15 
Specialised Facility Manufacturing 28 23 28 28 28 
Transportation Facility Manufacturing 48 43 48 48 48 
Electrical Machinery Manufacturing 32 32 32 32 32 
Communication Facility Manufacturing 17 12 17 17 17 
Scientific Instruments & Office Machinery 
22 19 13 19 19 
Manufacturing 
Craft Product Manufacturing 21 17 17 17 13 
Electricity S: Energy Production and 
47 47 47 47 49 
Supply 
Gas Production and Supply 61 61 61 62 61 
Water Production and Supply 7 5 5 5 7 
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2.5 Methodology 
The empirical model used in the current study is an augmented production 
function with the horizontal, backward and forward linkage indices added" 
In Y,, =a+A, In Kj, + ß2 In L., +, 63Horizontal _ 
FDIC; + /, Backward 
_ 
FDIC, 
(2.2) 
+ X35 Fonvard 
_ 
FDIC, + öX +s 
where Yj, stands for real output of firm i operating in sector j at time t, 
which is calculated by adjusting the reported sales for changes in inventories of 
finished goods and deflating the resulting value by the producer price of 
industrial products index". K; ij, stands for capital, which is defined as the 
value of fixed assets at the beginning of the year, deflated by the fixed assets 
investment index. L; ý, stands 
for labour, which is defined as the average 
number of workers. Horizontal 
_ 
FDIj, , 
Backward 
_ 
FDIC, and Fonvard 
_ 
FDIC, 
capture the horizontal, backward and forward linkages of FIEs respectively; X 
is a vector of control variables including time and sector dummies to allow for 
period-specific and sector-specific effects on productivity not attributable to 
the explanatory variables in the equation. All variables vary across sectors and 
"This formality is widely applied in the topic area. Further more, it is proved by Box-Cox test. 
'' All deflator indices are collected from the Henan Statistical Bureau. 
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over time. 
Similar to Blalock (2001), horizontal externality is measured as follows. 
Horizontal 
- 
FDIC, =E (Foreign,, * YýV, ) lE Yýr (2.3) 
where i, j, and t refer to firm i, sector j and time t respectively, and 
Foreign; ý, is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if foreign capital 
accounts for at least 25% of firm i's total equity. Therefore Horizontal _ 
FDIC, 
captures the extent of foreign presence in sector j at time t. 
As indicated earlier, the widely used measure of FDI Backward Linkage 
may induce severe estimation bias to the backward linkage effect on indigenous 
firms' productivity. Instead, in the current study, Backward 
_ 
FDIC, is defined as 
the weighted share of local input in downstream sectors sourced by firms with 
foreign capital participation, which can correct the measurement error 
mentioned. It is a proxy to measure the extent of FIEs' input sourced locally in 
downstream sectors. Thus the following formula is used: 
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Backward_ FDIC, =kJ (ask Horizontalk, Iiiput Share Coefcientk, )1G (2.4) 
where ask is the share of sector j 's output supplied to sector k taken from the 
2002 input-output table of Henan with 122 sectors compiled by Henan 
Statistical Bureau (HSB)", in which some sectors are aggregated to match the 
sector classification of the firm database. Input ShareCoefcienti, captures the 
extent of foreign firms' input sourced locally in sector j at timet. It is 
measured as the average share of the FIE's total input that is sourced locally" 
Specifically, 
Input Share Coef cient j, = Average 
(Local Input,, /Total Input) (2.5) 
foreigne j 
where Local Input;, equals the residual of the FIE's total input minus the input 
imported. 
To illustrate the meaning of the variable, suppose that 1/3 of the Metal 
 Inputs supplied within a sector are not included, as they are already captured in the 
Horizontal FDI variable. 
17 It is the latest 10 table of Henan published by HSB now. The 1997 10 table of Henan which 
is the previous term edition is not applied, since it may not fully capture the influence of Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997. 
IS Industry characteristics have often been found to be a predictor of variations in backward 
linkages of FIEs with indigenous firms. For detailed discussion see Lever (1974), Reid 
(1995), UNCTAD (2000) and Culverwell (2000). 
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manufacturing industry's output is sold to the auto industry, 1/3 to the 
Military industry and the remaining to the Furniture industry. If half of the 
production of the Auto industry is produced by foreign firms and the foreign 
firms in this industry source half of their inputs locally, there are no foreign 
firms in the Military industry, and half of the production of the Furniture 
industry is produced by foreign firms but all inputs of the foreign firms in the 
cake industry are imported: 
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Then the local source extent of foreign firms in downstream industries for the 
water industry, i. e. Backward_FDI, will be calculated as follows: 1/3*1/2*1/2 + 
1/3*0*0 + 1/3*1/2*0 = 1/12. However, if we calculate Backward_FDI by 
applying previous widely used measure as stated in equation (2.1), it would be 
1/3*1/2+1/3*0+1/3*1/2=1/3. Obviously, the extent of Backward Linkage of 
FDI would be overrated, and the more foreign firms source their inputs by 
importing the higher extent of this kind of overrating. Thus we argue that 
widely used measure of Bacfivard 
_ 
FDI could lead to serious estimation bias. 
Analogically Forward_FDI,, is intended to capture the extent of potential 
contacts between domestic consumers and foreign suppliers in upstream sectors. 
Following Javorcik (2004), it is defined as: 
Forward 
_FDIJI = ;4 
ßp[Lt (Y, -X11)1/[Y- (Y, -X11)]1 (2.6) 
11 Oreign %Eý IEl 
where 6,, is the proportion of sector j 's input sourced from sector 1 out of 
total inputs of sector j. Exports (X;, ) produced by foreign firms are excluded. 
While the coefficients taken from the 10 table remain fixed, the values of 
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the Horizontal 
_ 
FDI and InputShare Coefficient do change over time so the 
resulting proxies for horizontal externalities and vertical linkages are 
time-varying and sector-specific variables. 
In an exploratory regression, using OLS with White's correction for 
heteroskedasticity, the model (2.2) presented above is estimated with both the 
traditional measure of backward linkage and the new bias-corrected one. The 
estimations are performed on the full sample and on the sub-sample of 
indigenous firms'. The model includes fixed effects for years and sectors. The 
results in Table 2-2 indicate that the significance of both equation and variables 
is much improved. Furthermore, with the improved measure, for both full 
sample and sub-sample a significant and positive coefficient 
for Backward 
_ 
FDI 
, and a significant but negative coefficient 
for Horizontal 
- 
FDI are found. The spillover variable, Forward 
_ 
FDI does not 
appear to be statistically significant. 
" Indigenous firms are defined as those which have less than 25 percent foreign equity as 
mentioned above. 
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The negative coefficient for Hotizontal 
_ 
FDI does not necessarily mean 
that there is no horizontal externality from FDI. As discussed in the previous 
section, the Indirect Horizontal Externality effect of FDI can be separated from 
the general FDI horizontal effect. For this purpose, the following equation is 
estimated: 
In Y,, =a +, 8, In Ku, + /32 In Lj, + ß3 Hori-ontal 
_ 
FDIC, + ßa Backward 
_ 
FDI,, 
(2.7) 
+, 65 Forivard 
_ 
FDIC, + ß6lndirectHorizontal 
_ 
FDIC, + SX +s 
Based on the assumptions (benefits of specialization, increasing returns and 
transportation costs) 20 in Rodriguez-Clare's (1996) model, 
Indirect Horizontal 
- 
FDIC, is measured as follows: 
Indirect Horizontal_ FDIJ, =I E ßf, IHori: ontalj, BackwardCoefficient, (2.8) 
VP*i JJJ 
where 6,, is, the same as before, the proportion of sector j 's inputs sourced 
from sector I out of total inputs of sector j calculated based on the 
information on sourcing patterns from the input-output (10) table, and the 
Backward Coefcientj, is defined as follows. 
20 For details see Rodriguez-Clare (1996). 
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Backward Coefficient,, = Average (Local hipUt11 I jVage,, ) 21 (2.9) 
forcigniej 
As the formula indicates, the inputs sourced within the sector are not 
included, since this effect is captured in the variable Horizontal. The greater the 
foreign presence in sector j and the larger the share of inputs sourced from 
upstream sectors, the higher the value of the variable. 
To illustrate the meaning of Indirect Horizontal Externality clearly, suppose 
that the chocolate industry sources 1/3 of its inputs from the cocoa industry 
and 1/3 from the sugar industry. If half of total chocolate production comes 
from FIEs, and the backward coefficient of FIEs in the chocolate industry is 
2/3 
21 Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2003) propose the Backward Coefficient as follows. 
Backhard Coefficient;, = Average(Local Inrptrt,, /Skilled Labor, ) . But due to the data foreignie j 
set limitation, it is proxyed with 
Backward Coefficient;, = Average(Local Input,, /WVage,, ) as advised by Bravo-Ortega 
foreigniej 
(2004). 
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Figure 2-2 Chocolate Industry and Indirect Horizontal Externality 
Chocolate 
Horizontal 1 /2 11I Procurement 2/3 
Cocoa 1/3 11 Sugar 1/3 1 (Capital and Labour 1 
Then the indirect horizontal externality can be calculated as follows: 
(1/3+1/3)*1/2*2/3=2/9. A positive correlation between Indirect Horizontal 
Externality from FDI and indigenous firms' productivity is anticipated. " 
An econometric concern needs to be addressed before the analysis. As 
Moulton (1990) illustrates, the OLS method is based upon the assumption of 
independent disturbances, which is not appropriate for disturbances with 
grouped structure. Failing to take this into account can lead to a serious 
downward bias in standard errors, and spurious findings of statistical 
significance for the aggregate variable of interest. Since the data set is 
unbalanced and several sectoral variables are included in explaining firm level 
productivity, I have clustered the standard errors for all observations in the 
same industry and year on both full sample and sub-sample of indigenous firms. 
rz The test of autocorrelation is not reported but available upon request. 
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The correlation test sees the following Correlation Matrix. 
Correlation Matrix 
Horizontal Backward_FDI Forward FDI Indirectllorizontal_FDI 
FDI 
Horizontal FDI 1.00 
Backward FDI 0.29 1.00 
Forward_FDI 0.17 0.20 1.00 
IndirectHorizontll FDI 0.15 0.33 0.05 1.00 
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2.6 Empirical Results 
2.6.1 Baseline Specifications 
It is started by estimating equation (2.7) on both full sample and 
sub-sample of indigenous firms. Since knowledge externalities from FDI may 
take time to manifest themselves, two specifications are employed: one with 
contemporaneous and one with lagged spillover variables. Since the longer 
lagged variables can seriously strain the time span of the data set and hence 
reduce the size of the observations, only one-year lagged spillover variables are 
included. 
As can be seen from table 2-3, the results from these two samples are quite 
consistent in the two specifications. The coefficients for both FDI Backward 
Linkage and Indirect Horizontal Externality are positive and statistically 
significant, while the coefficient for general horizontal externality is negative 
and statistically significant. Forward linkage does not appear to be statistically 
significant. 
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The central message from table 2-3 is that the influence of FDI on the 
productivity of indigenous firms is complicated. On one hand, indigenous 
suppliers in upstream sectors can gain technical and managerial assistance 
through FDI Backward Linkage and firms in the same sector can benefit from 
the increasing variety or decreasing cost of inputs through the channel of 
Indirect Horizontal Externalities of FDI; on the other hand, the competition 
effect still dominates the influence of FDI on firms in the same sector. 
2.6.2 Different Firm Groups and Productivity Spillovers 
In many FDI spillover studies, all domestic firms are assumed to benefit 
equally from FDI. However, different indigenous firms have various absorptive 
capacities and the effectiveness of knowledge spillovers depending largely on the 
technical capabilities of indigenous firms. (Cantwell, 1995; Kokko et al. 1996; 
Kinoshita, 2001; Girma et al. 2001). To shed more insight into the effects of 
different FDI externality channels, the whole manufacturing sector is divided 
into different groups of firms to see which group actually benefits from 
horizontal, vertical and indirect horizontal spillovers from FDI. 
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2.6.2. A. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises 
(Non-SOEs) 
In China, there are two main types of indigenous manufacturing firms: 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). 
The latter include collectively- and privately-owned enterprises. SOEs are still 
perceived as being faced with soft-budget constraints and privileged access to 
financial capital. On the other hand, non-SOEs are much more market-oriented 
than SOEs. Indigenous Chinese firms of different ownership behave differently 
with respect to imitation, innovation and competition, and have different 
technological capabilities for knowledge absorption from the presence of foreign 
firms (Li et al. 2001). 
The estimation results for these two different groups of indigenous firms are 
presented in table 2-4. As can be seen in the left panel of the table, there 
appears to be no statistically significant backward linkage effect on the 
productivity of SOEs. Both horizontal and forward linkages of FDI produce 
significantly negative effects. The only exception is that SOEs can gain 
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statistically positive indirect horizontal externalities from FDI. In the right 
panel of Non-SOEs, it is interesting to note that both backward linkages and 
indirect horizontal effects are significantly positive. Furthermore, although the 
general horizontal effect on Non-SOEs is still negative, its magnitude is lower 
than on SOEs. The magnitude of the Indirect Horizontal Externality effect on 
Non-SOEs is higher than on SOEs. These phenomena may be due to the 
following reasons. 
Table 2-4 Estimation Results for Grouped Data: SOEs and Non-SOEs 
SOEs Non-SOEs 
coefficient significance coefficient significance 
Horizontal FDI -0.4660*** 0.002 -0.3320*** 0.000 
Backward FDI 0.5751 0.280 0.9524*** 0.000 
Forward FDI -0.0029*** 0.009 1.1067 0.127 
Indirect 0.0013* 0.075 0.0017** 0.023 
Horizontal FDI 
Number of 909 2762 
observations 
RI 0.89 0.91 
Prob F>0 0.07 0.00 
Note: *Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; 
***Significant at the 1 percent level 
As mentioned above, with weak technology and management skills, SOEs 
in China are generally inefficient as managers do not have very strong 
incentives to innovate and improve productivity. Thus the negative horizontal 
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effects may arise from fierce competition with FIEs operating in the same 
industries. As for backward linkages, SOEs may not be able to comply with the 
higher standards for the goods and services required by FIEs, or have 
difficulties in contract enforcement. The technological gap between SOEs and 
FIEs creates a significant barrier for effective technological diffusion, limiting 
the establishment of backward linkages between SOEs and FIEs and 
constraining the absorbability of SOEs. One tentative explanation for negative 
forward linkage effects on SOEs is the bargaining power of FIES. It is widely 
accepted that FIES have large bargaining power especially when they are 
operating in developing countries. They are also cautious about protecting their 
technologies and know-how. When downstream customers, especially SOEs, 
purchase products such as important components or parts from these 
multinationals, these customers or firms may have to accept some unfavourable 
terms such as high prices, resulting in higher production costs for them. 
However, non-SOEs seem to do much better than SOEs in these facets. 
Although they are generally small-sized and probably have lower technological 
capabilities as they have not been traditionally supported by the Chinese 
75 
government, non-SOEs have more flexible human resource management styles 
and stronger incentives to learn and imitate. Therefore, they can benefit more 
from the presence of FDI in downstream sectors and suffer less from 
competition from FIEs in the same sectors. 
2.6.2. B Exporters and Non-Exporters 
To further investigate the various spillover effects of FDI, the firms are 
divided into exporters and non-exporters. The division is based on the following 
account. First, the competition effect of horizontal externalities would be 
expected to apply most strongly to non-exporting firms, since they have to 
compete with FIEs in the indigenous market. Similarly, this effect should be 
less for exporters since their export activities should enable them to avoid, at 
least to a certain extent, competition with FIES in the indigenous market. 
Second, as stated by Kokko et al. (1996), exporters and non-exporters can be 
regarded as having different levels of absorptive capacity, since it has recently 
been shown theoretically and empirically that exporters have higher efficiency 
and productivity levels than non-exporters (Bernard and Jensen, 1999, Melitz, 
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2003)23 
To examine whether there are different FDI spillover effects between 
exporters and non-exporters, the estimation is based on the following equation. 
In Y,, =a+, 6, In K,, + ß2 In L,,, + ß3 Horizontal 
_ 
FDIC, + Q4 Baclnvard 
_ 
FDIC, 
+ QSFortivard 
_ 
FDIC, + /36lndirect Horizontal 
_ 
FDIC, + Dummy_ export + 
(2.10) 
, 67 Horizontal _ 
FDIC, * Dummy_ export + ß8 Bacbvard 
_ 
FDIC, * Dummy_ export 
+ /39 Fortivard 
_ 
FDIC, * Dummy_ export + SX +s 
where Dumny_export is a dummy variable for export activity, which equals one 
if firm i exports products. The variables with spillover variables being 
multiplied respectively by the export dummy are proposed to capture the 
interaction effects between spillover and export activities. 
The estimation results are presented in table 2-5. In the right panel for the 
full sample, it can be seen that all coefficients for spillover variables are 
statistically significant except for that of forward linkage, and the sign for each 
variable is similar to the estimation results above. It is interesting to note that 
the coefficient of the export dummy is significantly positive, indicating that the 
23 In order to substantiate this assumption, Girma et al. (2004) test the performances of 
exporters and non-exporters separately on their data set. As a result, exporters perform much 
better for all performance measures, which support the assumption that exporters are more 
efficient and therefore have better levels of absorptive capacity than non-exporters. 
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productivity of exporters is higher than non-exporters. This is consistent with 
the finding of Girme, et al. (2004). The interaction terms of 
Horizontal * Dummy and Backward * Dummy are significantly positive, 
showing that exporters have better absorptive capacity for horizontal 
externalities and vertical externalities via FDI Backward Linkage, or can better 
avoid competition with FIEs in the indigenous market. 
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Furthermore, comparing the differences of the estimation results on the full 
sample of all firms and the sub-sample of indigenous firms, the magnitudes of 
the coefficients on the spillover variables for the full sample are larger than 
those for the sub-sample, but the reverse is true for the interaction variables. 
These differences indicate that FIES in Chine, have better absorptive and 
competitive capacities than indigenous Chinese firms, but the difference of 
absorptive and competitive capacity between FIE exporters and non-exporters 
is smaller or less significant than that between Chinese indigenous exporters 
and non-exporters. As a robust check, the same estimation was also performed 
for export intensity instead of export dummy, and similar results were obtained. 
This corroborates the findings" 
1t The results are not reported but available upon request. 
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2.7 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Using an unbalanced panel data set of foreign and indigenous Chinese 
manufacturing firms from 1999 to 2003, this chapter investigates whether 
productivity spillovers from FDI in the host economy exist. Different from the 
existing studies, this study incorporates a mechanism of Indirect Horizontal 
Externalities and what is believed as a better measure of vertical linkages into 
the spillover channel system for the first time. The heterogeneity of firms in 
terms of absorptive capacity is also considered. 
Together with confirming the existence of positive spillovers on 
manufacturing firms in China through backward linkages and negative 
spillovers from horizontal externalities of FDI, this study has empirically 
proven the Indirect Horizontal Externalities of FDI to be a channel that 
benefits the host economy. Furthermore, it is found that non-SOEs perform 
better than SOEs as the former have higher incentives to learn and imitate from 
FIEs in Chinese manufacturing. It is also found that indigenous exporting firms 
are more likely to benefit from FDI spillovers. 
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The findings in this chapter have important managerial and policy 
implications. While backward linkages between FIEs and indigenous firms can 
improve the productivity of the domestic manufacturing sector in a developing 
country, the tendency for FIEs to source the most sophisticated and complex 
components depends essentially on the capabilities of local suppliers. In 
particular, to absorb and benefit more from such externalities, indigenous firms 
must have a certain level of technological capability and management skills. 
Additionally, a commitment of top management to quality upgrading is also 
inevitable. As researched by Yoon, 1994; Belderbos et al., 2001, the "right 
attitude" is often regarded by some MNCs as more important character than 
the actual level of quality at any given point of time. Thus on one hand, 
indigenous firms in the developing countries should not be short-sightedly 
putting a high premium on short-term profit only, on the other hand there 
should be sufficient policy support provided from local government side, 
including provision of information, matchmaking, financial support, training to 
improve management knowledge and practices, and policies to effectively 
promote R&D and technical progress of local firms. In addition, managers in 
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indigenous firms should participate in foreign trade to get in touch with the 
newest technology in the world. With higher levels of technological capabilities 
and managerial skills, indigenous firms will be in a better position to learn from 
and compete with FIES. Therefore, there will be a virtuous reaction between 
FIES and indigenous firms for productivity development in a developing 
country. 
Since it has been empirically proved in this chapter that backward linkage 
between FIES and their local suppliers (FDI Backward Linkage) is an 
important channel through which the host country may benefit from the inward 
FDI, the subsequent studies will try to make a contribution to investigate the 
ways that the host government could use to promote such linkage. 
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Chapter 3: Is There a Link between FIES' Characteristics and the Creation of 
FDI Linkage? 
84 
3.1 Chapter Preamble 
It has been empirically proved in Chapter 2 that backward linkage between 
FIEs and their local suppliers (FDI Backward Linkage) is an important channel 
through which the host country may benefit from the inward FDI. Specifically, 
the creation of FDI backward linkage may induce vertical spillovers from MNEs 
to their local suppliers in the upstream industry and even indirect horizontal 
spillovers to the local firms in the same industry. Thus promoting FDI 
Linkage" is recommended to the government for the development of local 
economy in the host country. 
Generally speaking, FDI policies imposed by the host government can be 
divided into two categories, attracting policy and administrating policy. As the 
second stage of current research, this chapter will try to make a contribution to 
the investigation of the determinants of FDI Linkage so that the host 
government could strategically take these determinants into consideration as a 
filter when making FDI attracting policies. 
2' FDI Backward Linkage is abbreviated as FDI Linkage in the following studies. 
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3.2 Introduction 
Creating production linkage between foreign investment enterprises (FIES) 
and indigenous suppliers i. e. FDI Linkage has been widely accepted both in 
academics and practice as an important way for the host country to tap the 
benefits of inward FDI (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Markusen and Venables, 1999; 
UNCTAD, 2001a). 
Dunning (1993) states that in comparison to pure indigenous firms FIEs 
usually have better information about world wide prices and quality of 
components. Thus connecting with FIEs, indigenous suppliers could benefit 
from such linkage by three ways. Firstly, the linkage could raise output and 
employment of linked indigenous suppliers. The indirect effect on supplier 
capabilities is probably more important. Linkage could be powerful channels for 
diffusing knowledge and skills from FIEs to their indigenous suppliers. Strong 
linkage could promote productivity growth, technological and managerial 
capabilities and market diversification in supplier firms. The strengthening of 
suppliers could in turn lead to various indirect effects and spillovers for the rest 
of the host economy. Another advantage of such linkage is that it could increase 
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the local integration and rooting of FIEs and make them less footloose 
(UNCTAD, 2001a). 26 
In retrospect, FDI linkage promotion is not a new policy issue for host 
countries (see, for example, Lall, 1980; UNCTC, 1981), but it deserves renewed 
attention. Although some frequently used measures to promote linkage, like 
local content requirements, are no longer permissible in the context of the WTO 
or other international agreements. It is still possible to promote linkage, but 
tools would be different from those which were used in the past. Therefore this 
subject re-attracts considerable attention in these days. Based on these 
backgrounds, current study tries to complement the existing FDI Linkage 
promotion policies by filtering out more local linkage preferable FIEs. 
This study focuses on analysing the factors that could impact the creation 
of FDI linkage, using a unique firm level panel data set covering the entire 
manufacturing industries in China from 2003 to 2005. Current study extends 
the existing findings by focusing on four issues that are likely to play an 
2G Since FDI linkage involve cost and effort by FIES, stronger linkage could make it more 
difficult for them to divest. 
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important role but neglected in previous literature, namely measure bias of the 
FDI linkage, firm heterogeneity, linkage quality, and appropriate methodology. 
Firstly both two types of normally used measures of FDI linkage may overstate 
the magnitude of a FIE's linkage with indigenous suppliers. It is argued that the 
findings through applying those traditional measures could be misleading. 
Therefore the main body of the empirical analysis will employ a better 
measure 27 of FDI linkage. Secondly the data set, which includes panel 
information of 527 manufacturing FIES from 2003 to 2005, allows this study to 
reap the advantages of panel data analysis such as more accurate inference of 
estimation and controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity etc z' . 
Thirdly the issue of linkage quality is taken into consideration in the analysis. 
To the best of my knowledge, it is the first time for empirical work to touch this 
issue. Finally the application of so-called "two-step fixed effect panel analysis 
procedure" makes the estimation of time-constant variables practicable while 
still benefits from the merits of panel fixed effect analysis. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section 
27 The new measure does not overstate the magnitude of FDI Linkage. 
zý For details, see Chen, Hsiao (2003). 
88 
reviews the existing literature with regard to the determining factors of FDI 
linkage, and several traditionally used measures of FDI linkage as well as my 
arguments on them. Section 3.4 gives a description of the data set. Section 3.5 
presents the empirical models and the methodologies. Section 3.6 describes 
estimation results. The last section concludes the main findings and discusses 
policy implications. 
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3.3 Literature Review 
3.3.1 Determinants of FDI Linkage 
Based on previous literature, the following 7 factors might impact a FIE on 
its sourcing decision, i. e. the possibility of the creation of FDI linkage in the 
host country. 
" Market Orientation 
" Familiarity to the Host Economy 
" Entry Mode 
" Size 
" lain originality 
0 Autonomy of sourcing 
" Industry Characteristics 
a) Market Orientation 
A FIE's market-orientation has been found to lead to variation in level of 
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local content and subsequent relations with host suppliers (Pangestu et al., 
1992; Supapol, 1995). Driffield and Noor (1999) find evidence that firms with a 
desire to enter the indigenous market, to supply other foreign firms, or seek low 
labour costs and government incentives, show higher levels of FDI linkage. It is 
suggested that FIEs that serve essentially the host market have more intense 
FDI linkage with indigenous suppliers than those who are export oriented 
(UNCTAD, 2000b; Altenburg, 2000). Giroud (2003) also finds that 
export-oriented foreign firms would tend to purchase less locally in developing 
countries, even though they show a tendency to have closer relationship with 
existing indigenous suppliers. 
b) Familiarity to the Host Economy 
Theoretically, FIEs may increase their local sourcing over time due to a 
"familiar effect", i. e. it may take time for FIES to be familiar with the host 
market as well as indigenous suppliers, and then to find the appropriate 
suppliers. Several factors may contribute to the gradual development of linkage: 
further production processing stages are added over time, the autonomous 
growth of the manufacturing sector brings up new suppliers, the knowledge 
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about the local business environment is complemented by the recruitment of 
local managers, and some FIEs take deliberate actions to attract and develop 
indigenous suppliers. 
The findings of a number of studies support this point. McAleese and 
McDonald (1978), who studied Irish manufacturing during the period between 
1952 and 1974, explain that the age of the plant is a key factor in explaining 
embeddings into the host economy, and local purchase of inputs increases as the 
FIE becomes familiar to the host market. With cross-sectional data for Ireland, 
O'Farrell and O'Loughlin (1981) also find that more established foreign firms 
have higher FDI linkage than new firms. Analogously, using the cross country 
survey data Tavares and Young (2002) find that the age of the subsidiary is 
negatively associated with import propensity. The similar result is found by 
Driffield and Noor (1999) as well. However, as Phelps (1997) has argued, plants 
established in more recent decades may be more "in tune" with contemporary 
(perhaps more internationalised) patterns of sourcing than plants of older 
"vintage", which may be slower to adjust new sourcing imperatives and retain 
stronger ties to the regional economy. 
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c) Entry Mode 
Belderbos et al. (2001) in a study of Japanese FIEs find that acquired FIEs 
have significantly higher local content levels than those established through 
Greenfield investment due to their pre-acquisition embeddings in the host 
economy. Similarly, affiliates of Swedish FIEs and affiliates in Central and 
Eastern European countries have been found to rely more on imports of inputs 
when established via Greenfield investment. As stated in the World Investment 
Report 2001 (UNCTAD, 2001a), wholly-owned FIES usually have to take time 
and effort to develop local supply linkage while the joint ventures have 
"ready-made" linkage that are likely to be retained by their cooperation 
partners. 
However, not all findings support this argument. Driffield and Noor (1999) 
find no relationship between joint ventures and FDI linkage. And Tavares and 
Young (2002) find no relationship between Greenfield investment and the 
import propensity of that FIE. In addition, it is found that if existing local 
supply linkage maintained by cooperation partners is inefficient, FIEs may take 
a chance to switch to foreign suppliers (UNCTAD, 2001a). 
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d) Size of FIEs 
Lots of research verifies that the functions of network linkage may depend 
on the size of the investor. Large FIES have been found to source less locally 
than small ones (UNCTAD, 2001a). An Irish study shows that large and 
expanding FIES have relatively lower local procurement level (Corg and Ruane, 
2000). This is explained as larger firms may have greater difficulty finding a 
global supplier of appropriate scale locally, as Irish suppliers may lack the 
necessary scale for supplying the global need of large firms. In Mexico, the small 
size of indigenous suppliers is found to be an obstacle to linkage creation by 
large foreign electronic and auto-parts firms (Carrillo et al, 2001). Other studies, 
including Schachmann and Fallis (1989), Halbach (1989) and Barkley and 
McNamara (1994), support this point with their empirical evidence. 
However, some researchers raise diverse statements and argue that large 
firms might find it easier to penetrate into a large and primitive market on 
account of their sheer size. "For a large investor who demands sizable local 
supply linkage in the production process, host country agents and suppliers 
may modify themselves to accommodate the needs of the foreign investor in the 
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process of forming a network of their own. " (Chen and Chen, 1998). And 
Tavares and Young (2002) do not find a significant relationship between the size 
of a FIE subsidiary and its import propensity. 
e) The origin of FIEs 
Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) point out that there is systematic difference 
in local purchase depending on the foreign firms' originality. This attributes to 
the different histories and cultures within which the foreign firms originate 
(Porter, 1990; Ruigrok and Van, 1995). Dicken et al (1994) hold similar 
assertion in the geographical literature, insisting that different nationalities 
may have different dispositions towards host country sourcing. They suggest 
that European FIEs may rely more on indigenous firms than U. S. or Japanese 
firms. Driffield and Noor (1999) find that United States firms originating from 
United States are more embedded in Malaysia, and suggest that the creation of 
FDI linkage with American firms are much easier than with Japanese, EU or 
other Southeast Asian firms. While in some other studies, no country effect is 
found when explaining input behaviour (Tavares and Young, 2002). In 
summary, the origin of a FIE is a controversial factor when it comes to 
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explaining FDI linkage. 
f) Autonomy of sourcing 
The relationship between a FIE and its parent firm or in other words, the 
level of autonomy is another key factor in connection with the procurement 
choice of FIEs. The greater the autonomy of an affiliate the more likely it 
chooses to try and identify indigenous suppliers and to create relationship with 
indigenous suppliers (UNCTAD, 2001a). Similarly, O'Farrell and O'Loughlin 
(1981) find that foreign firms which have total autonomy over input purchasing 
source more of their inputs locally than firms that do not have the sourcing 
autonomy. In fact, most multinational firms locate their decision-making 
centres in their home countries, thus the affiliates will have less freedom in their 
choice of input sourcing; and parent companies may show some favouritism 
towards home country suppliers because they are closer and more familiar with 
home country suppliers. 
However, these arguments are open to debate, as parochialism is surely 
unsustainable in an increasingly competitive global market. Tavares and Young 
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(2002) find a positive significant relationship between input import propensity 
and the "product mandates" affiliates. Yet Giroud and Alirz=. (2004) find that 
foreign subsidiaries that were product mandates show higher level of imported 
inputs. 
g) Industry characteristics 
Industry characteristics have often been found to be a predictor of 
variations in supply linkage of FIEs with Indigenous firms (Crone and Watts, 
2003). In the primary sector, such as mining industry, the scope of the linkage 
between FIEs and indigenous suppliers is often limited (UNCTAD, 2000; 
Culverwell, 2000). Textile and clothing sector show relatively lower FDI linkage. 
Food processing and engineering activities involve extensive supply linkage 
between FIEs and indigenous suppliers but mainly of rate and packaging 
materials. Relatively, supply chain management becomes more important in 
electronics and automobile sector. A number of investigations show that many 
FIEs in electronics industry attain benefits from linkage with indigenous 
suppliers. In Mexico and the Caribbean Basin, FIEs in electronics industry have 
sought greater efficiency by integrating host country production facilities into 
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their regional systems, while targeting the United States market (ECKEL, 
2003). Tavares and Young (2002) find that FIES in the textile, clothing and 
footwear industries have a strong propensity to import inputs, thus few FDI 
linkage would be expected. In the hard disk drive industry, the local content 
level of FIES in Thailand is estimated over 30 to 40 per cent of total production 
cost in 2001 (Fosfuri et al., 2001). In addition, although the level of local 
purchasing may be limited in developing countries within the electronics and 
electrical industries, there are extensive scopes for linkage creation between 
FIEs and indigenous suppliers (Halbach, 1989; Rasiah, 1995; Supapol, 1995; 
Giroud, 2003). 
In the other direction, researchers try to find out what common characters 
of an industry affect the FIES' local sourcing decision. Lever (1974) and Reid 
(1995) discover that it is easier to source externally when the technology is 
divisible into separate stages and services than when it is a continuous process. 
Phelps (1996) finds that FIES producing lowv-tech products often use relatively 
simple inputs, which are more likely to be available from indigenous suppliers 
because they are established technologies with low barriers to market entry. In 
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contrast, specialised inputs are less likely to be sourced from indigenous 
suppliers because fewer indigenous suppliers will possess the technical 
capability to manufacture complex inputs, so there would be fewer local 
sourcing opportunities. Also, the higher value-to-weight ratio of technologically 
complex inputs means they can bear the higher transportation costs associated 
with purchasing from distant suppliers (O'Farrel and O'Loughlin, 1981). In 
addition, Giroud and Mirza (2004) state that in an industry where product 
circles are short and new inputs are likely to be needed often, a foreign firm may 
be more active in looking for alternative sources of supply. Thus the age of the 
production of key products may also have an impact on FDI linkage. According 
to the World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2001a), "FIES making 
standardised products with mature, non-proprietary technologies tend to prefer 
externalised, arm's length procurement. " This phenomenon may be interpreted 
in a way that for FIEs there are many suppliers to choose from, so that it is not 
necessary to develop special capabilities in any supplier. On the other hand, 
when products are specialised and technologically advanced, FIEs tend to 
prefer in-house production or to retain the relationship with a few selected 
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suppliers. However, Amin and Malmberg (1992) hold complete disagreement 
that standardised inputs tend to be sourced longer distance from other regions 
where non-standardised inputs tend to be procured from nearby specialist 
suppliers. They explain that standardised inputs, associated with standardised 
products, can be readily obtained from distant suppliers once the initial deal 
has been struck as only the size of order needs to be discussed. Conversely, close 
proximity to suppliers is thought to be beneficial for specific inputs because of 
the need to frequently renegotiate supply contracts and amend specifications. 
Through the literature review, it can be realised that the findings of 
previous research on the determinants of FDI linkage are still ambiguous. 
Hereby I -argue that the inconsistent empirical findings may attribute to the 
overstated measure of FDI linkage "and the shortcomings of cross-section 
analysis. 
The problem of those traditionally applied measures of FDI linkage will be 
fully discussed in next section. This study will incorporate a better measure and 
20 Theoretically speaking the exaggerated measurement can not guarantee the accuracy of the 
empirical finding, and the exaggeration varies according to the different situation where the 
analysed data is collected, thus the inconsistent empirical findings may more or less attribute to 
the overstated measure of FDI Linkage. 
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employ "two-step fixed effect panel procedure" panel data model into the 
estimation, which is believed to be likely to result in more convincing results. 
3.3.3 Extent of Local Supply Linkage 
As stated in World Investment Report 2001 (UNCTAD, 2001a), a FIE may 
have four options to obtain production inputs in a host country: import, 
produce locally in house, procure from locally based foreign-owned suppliers, or 
from indigenous suppliers (see Figure 1). Among them, FDI linkage, i. e. the link 
between a FIE and those indigenous suppliers is the focus of current study. 
Figure 3-1 Options for FIEs with regards to Obtaining Inputs 
Options available to a FIE to obtain inputs 
Source: UNCTAD, 2001a 
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In the existing literature, FDI linkage is usually measured by either the 
local share of a FIE's input sourcing or the local content of a FIE's. 
" Local share of a FIE's input sourcing indicates the share of inputs 
supplied by all locally based suppliers in the host country, which include 
locally based but foreign-owned suppliers and indigenous suppliers. 
Note that this measure does not divide the ownership of suppliers 
(indigenous or foreign-owned). 
" Local content of a FIE's production indicates the share of total outputs 
(components or intermediate products and ancillary products and 
services) produced locally. This includes inputs produced in-house by 
the FIE as well as those produced externally by both locally based but 
foreign-owned suppliers and indigenous suppliers. In some studies, share 
of imported inputs of a FIE's is sometimes used as a mirror image of 
local content (Tavares and Young, 2005). 
It is obvious that the proxy local share of a FIE's input sourcing can not 
distinguish the locally based foreign-owned suppliers from the indigenous 
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suppliers. Thus by covering all locally based suppliers, the analysis on the 
extent of FDI linkage undoubtedly overstates the contribution of FDI linkage to 
indigenous firms30. While further including in-house production by FIEs, the 
proxy Local content of a FIE's production could perform worse. Thus I argue 
that these traditional measures of FDI linkage may not accurately reflect the 
magnitude of a FIE's supply linkage with indigenous suppliers, and the existing 
findings through employing these measures could be more or less misleading. 
The more FIEs source inputs from other FIEs in the host country or even make 
in-house production, the more the estimation bias would be. Theoretically, the 
measure by local share of a FIE's input sourcing would relatively hold less bias 
than the measure by Local content of a FIE's production if this type of bias 
could not be at all avoided. 
With more information of suppliers, fortunately, the unique dataset for this 
study allows correcting this bias and provides more convincing results. In 
current study FDI linkage is measured as the share of inputs purchased by a 
'0 For example, in Malaysia, although locally-procured components by FIEs in the electronics 
and electrical industries comprised 62 percent of exports in 1994; the corresponding figure for 
Thailand was 40 percent, the most strategic parts and components were supplied mainly by 
foreign-owned companies rather than domestic ones in both countries (UNCTAD, 2000a). 
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FIE from indigenous suppliers in a host country. To further illustrate the bias 
that could be made by those traditional utilised measures, the estimation 
results by different measures will be compared. 
104 
3.4 Data Description 
The firm level data set used in this study is from the Annual Foreign Firm 
Statistics, conducted by Henan Provincial Department of Commerce, China. 
Henan ranked 14"' in 2003/2004 and 13`x' in 2005 on the total amount of FDI 
utilised overall 31 provinces in China, thus its FDI status is very close to the 
average level of China 31. The Annual Foreign Firm Statistics has been 
undertaken since 2003 and data are available for this study within the period 
2003-2005. The main advantages of this statistic are that it covers virtually all 
known active firms, and the response rate is generally over 61 percent. Since 
this study focuses on foreign manufacturing only, the sample constitutes 527 
FIES in 36 two-digit manufacturing industries. The data include information on 
ownership classification, sales, intangible assets, employment, start-up year, 
intermediate inputs cost, imports and exports, main input suppliers32 and 
volume of transaction, etc. A firm has been defined to be indigenous if its 
3' The author has tried to involve data from more other representative provinces, but the data 
availability in those areas is not good enough to proceed the analysis necessary in current 
research. 
32 This information is obtained through an additional survey. The survey questionnaire is provided as 
appendix. 
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foreign equity participation, if any, is below 25%33 
In order to be comparable with previous literature, the 36 two-digit sectors 
are aggregated into 11 sectors. " Table 3.1 provides a brief description of the 
sample by sectors. The number of firms in operation varies over time, of which 
437 existed at the beginning and 461 at the end of the sample period. Of those 
that existed from the beginning, 371 remained at the end of the sample period. 
Due to entry and exit and ownership restructuring, the dataset appears holding 
a unique feature of rotating unbalanced panel in this dataset. After a test for 
potential sample selection bias, which is suggested by Nijman and Verbeek 
(1992), it is proved that there exists no statistically significant sample selection 
bias at 97 percent probability of rejection. Furthermore, the data are cleaned 
via extensive checks for nonsense observations, outliers, coding mistakes and 
the like. 
The definition of indigenous firm varies in the literature. But the 25% cut-off is officially 
defined by Chinese government. 
"They are Mining, Food processing & manufacturing, Textiles & clothing, Mineral processing, 
Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Ordinary machinery manufacturing, Transport equipment 
manufacturing, Electronics, Energy manufacturing & supply, and others. The aggregation 
scheme is not reported but available upon request. 
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Table 3-1 Brief Description of the Sample by Sectors 
Sample 2003 2004 2005 
Number of foreign firms 437 429 461 
Alining 7 7 8 
Food processing & 
38 37 38 
manufacturing 
Textiles, clothing & footwear 103 100 108 
Mineral processing 54 54 53 
Chemicals 59 60 68 
Pharmaceuticals 12 14 15 
Ordinary machinery 
34 36 37 
manufacturing 
Transport equipment 
19 19 20 
manufacturing 
Electronics 72 73 78 
Energy manufacturing and 
10 10 10 
supply 
Others 29 19 27 
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3.5 Methodology 
To find out the determinants and their impacts on FIEs' FDI linkage, the 
following equation are estimated. 
FDI 
_Linkage; ý, =, 
ß, MO;, +, 2F, arniliarity;, +, ß3size;, +/. 3,, DEntryMode, (3.1) 
+/ 35 D_Autonomy; +xOrigin; +Slndustryj+, u, +, u; +E; ý, 
FDI_Lirrkage; 
ý, =/3, MO;, +/ 
32 Familiarity; +ß, size;; +ß4D_EntryMode, (3.2) 
+ß5D_Autonomy, +XOrigin, +8lndustryj + fr, +Ic; +E; ý, 
FDI_Linkage; 
ý, =/3, MO;, +, 
ß2Familiarity;, +/33size;, +ßßD_EntiyMode, 
+ß5D_ Autonomy; +ß6D_Netiv, xFamiliarity,, +XOrigin; +SIndustryj +, u, (3.3) 
ff [f + Eyl 
where FDI 
_ 
Linkage;, stands for the supply linkage with indigenous suppliers 
of foreign firm i operating in sector j at time 1, which is calculated by the 
share of inputs purchased from indigenous suppliers. MO;, stands for the 
market orientation (international or host market) of foreign firm i at time 1, 
which is calculated by the share of export in total sale. Familiarity;, is a proxy 
to account for the development of familiarity to the host market after a foreign 
firm entered the host country. It is specified as the number of years that foreign 
firm i has been established in the host country. Following Gorg and Ruane 
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(2001), 1 also allow for a possible non-linearity (quadratic) relationship by 
including Familiarity in model (3.2). To capture "vintage effect", an 
interaction variable D_ Neti , 
*Familiarity,, is further included in model (3.3). 
Dummy variable D_ Neti , equals one 
if foreign firm i was established within 3 
yeas. Size;, is calculated as the employment of foreign firm i at time 
yMode; is a dummy variable taking the value of zero if foreign firm i t. D_ Entr 
is established through Greenfield investment. D_Autononry; is a dummy 
variable taking the value of zero if foreign firm i has no sourcing autonomy as 
a foreign affiliate. Origin; is a dummy vector that stands for the main origin of 
foreign firm i, i. e. Europe, North America, Japan, Asian but except Japan, 
Hong Kong or Taiwan, and others. Industry, is an industry group dummy 
vector. % is the vector of coefficients on Origin of main ownership; 8 is the 
vector of coefficients on Industry ; u, and p; are time and firm specific errors 
and meant to capture time and firm specific effects on the FDI linkage not 
attributable to the explanatory variables in the equation, c,, is an iid error 
term. 
Although it is believed that the detailed information contained in the 
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survey allows extracting much of the previously unobserved firm specific effect, 
the remaining omitted time-invariant firm specific effect still can bias the 
estimation". Fortunately, panel data within model can help solve this issue. If 
within estimator was employed ", all firm observed and unobserved 
time-invariant fixed effects would be dropped out, and the bins in estimating 
time-variant variables could be removed. However this would lose the 
opportunity to perform the impact of observed but time-invariant variables. 
Therefore, this study adopts the two-step fixed effect panel estimation 
procedure for all the estimations37. Taking equation (3.1) as an example, in the 
first step, the within estimator is used to get unbiased estimates of A, ß2 
and A. Year dummies are also included in the estimated equation to control for 
time trend, e. g. the effect of policy. Predicted values of the time-variant effects 
are generated by taking the residuals which contain the portion of Local supply 
Linkage decision that could not be explained by the estimates of time-variant 
variables as well as time dummies: 
See Schmidt (1985) for a discussion on using panel data to estimate firm level efficiency. 
First difference estimator is an alternative, but it is less consistent than within estimator. 
37 See Black and Lynch (1997) for an initial application. 
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FDI_Linkagey., -/31MO,, -gFamiliarity,, -gsize,, =ß4D_EntiyMode; (3.4) 
+ (35 D_ Autonomy; + XOrigin; + Sbndustryj +p, + p; + s; ý, 
Then average this value over the 2003-2005 periods for each firm to get an 
estimate of the firm specific, time-invariant component of residual. 
In the second step, regress the averaged residual on those variables observed 
but omitted in the first step as well as time dummies to get estimates 
of ß4 ,, 
ßs 
, (p and t5. 
The advantage of this two-step fixed effect panel analysis 
procedure is two fold. On one hand relative to cross section estimation, it can 
address the issue of bias due to the heterogeneity; on the other hand relative to 
pure fixed effect model, it allows us to estimate those observed time-invariant 
variables. " 
In addition, all models are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's 
correction (White, 1980), which ensures the consistency of estimates. As a 
robust check of the estimations, the sample is also divided into a number of 
finite categories using the discrete choice model to perform all estimations 
(through ordered probit models with distinct thresholds), and similar results 
" Although bias can still arise in the estimation of the second step, this methodology reduces 
the heterogeneity problem to the maximum extent. 
were obtained". This corroborates the above findings. 
The equation (3.1) is also estimated with local share of a FIE's input 
sourcing and local content of a FIE's production, two traditionally utilised 
measures of FDI linkage of a FIE's, in order to illustrate the bias that could be 
made by employing these measures. 
39 The results are not reported in the paper, but available upon request. 
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3.6 Empirical Results 
The estimation comparison between my measure and the two traditionally 
utilised ones is shown in table 3-2. It can be found in table 3-2 that the 
differences -among the results by employing different measures are considerable. 
They are not just in magnitude, but imply opposite findings in some cases; and 
in general, the measure by local content of a FIE's production leads more bias. 
Thus this study appeals the cautious application of previous findings based on 
those traditional measures of FIEs' FDI linkage. 
Table 3-3 presents the results by employing the bias-corrected measure of 
FIEs' FDI linkage, unique data set, and performed "two-step fixed effect panel 
analysis procedure". Generally speaking, the results confirm some usually held 
expectations but also highlight some innovative and less commonly explored 
aspects. It is believed that the results are more convincing than previous 
empirical studies'. 
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a) Market Orientation 
It is found that the more export out of the sales of a FIE, the less input 
sourcing from indigenous suppliers. The findings statistically proved the 
relationship between market orientation of a FIE in China and its propensity of 
FDI linkage creation. Host market orientation would make a FIE have higher 
intention to purchase inputs from indigenous suppliers. Some researchers 
explained this phenomenon. Altenburg (2000) stated that when serving the 
local market, foreign firms will need to adapt their production to the local 
conditions and tend to be more integrated in host economy. On the other hand, 
export oriented foreign affiliates are generally part of a global sourcing and 
distribution network managed by the parent company and have higher quality 
requirements which can be difficult for the indigenous suppliers to meet 
(Mucchielli & Jabbour, 2001). Specified on Chinese market, this trend may also 
attribute to the government policy on indigenization of business. Chinese 
government, which pursues more export-generating development rather than 
import-substituting development in the previous years, may impose less control 
on the import of intermediate goods (Huang, 1998). Hence, it seems natural 
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that export-oriented firms need less cooperation with local firms, to the extent 
that they can import intermediate goods. Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) hold 
the same view and state that perhaps it is because import licenses are easier to 
obtain for exporters. 
b) Familiarity to the host economy 
Both "familiar effect" and "vintage effect" mentioned above are supported 
by this study. It is found there is positive and statistically significant 
relationship between FDI linkage and a FIE's familiarity in China. This 
suggests that FIEs may procure more from Chinese owned suppliers along with 
their increasing familiarity in China. But there is no quadratic relationship 
found given the non-significance of Familiarity it . As far as "vintage effect" is 
concerned, the empirical results show that newly established FIEs have lower 
linkage potential although it will increase as well following with the 
development of familiarity in the host economy. Another key fact behind this 
phenomenon is that this type of linkage may enhance at an increasing rate 
when the firm is more familiar with the host market. 
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c) Entry Mode 
FIES established through merge and acquisition (M&A) are proved to have 
a higher propensity of FDI linkage creation than those established through 
Greenfield investment. As explained by Barkley and 1\-IcNamara (1994) as well 
as Scott-Kennel and Enderwick (2001), a possible reason is that a regional 
purchasing network is already established in the former case. Correspondingly, 
wholly foreign-owned firms through Greenfield investment may initially rely on 
familiar sources of inputs rather than develop local supply linkage with 
indigenous firms. 
d) Size 
A FIE's size measured by employment is confirmed negatively correlated 
with its extent of FDI linkage. This may be due to that large firms normally are 
able to internalise their operations better, and indigenous suppliers may find it 
difficult to supply very large volumes. While for the small firms, they are 
generally more adaptive than large firms which may have difficulty in finding a 
niche in highly internationalised networks. 
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Although large FIEs usually have low FDI propensity, they might on the 
other hand be more beneficial to the host country in terms of linkage quality. 
Relative to small firms, large firms normally have more strength due to better 
technological and managerial capabilities. Thus the connection with large FIEs 
may be more efficient for indigenous suppliers to obtain benefits. In order to 
explore this further, the relationship between a FIE's strength and its FDI 
linkage is analysed. To the best of my knowledge, current study is the first to 
involve the issue of linkage quality in the relevant empirical study. The strength 
of a firm is proxyed as the ratio of its intangible assets to gross profit. Because 
there may exist co-linearity between variables strength and size, size is not 
included in the regression. It is found no relationship between the strength of 
FIEs' and their FDI due to the low level significance. 
e) Autonomy of Sourcing 
The autonomy level of sourcing is predicted to be another factor relating to 
the procurement of FIES. This study supports this point. It is found that 
foreign firms as affiliates which have thorough autonomy over input purchasing 
may source more of their inputs from Chinese owned suppliers than those have 
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less or no autonomy. Dunning's statement (1993) indicates a possible 
explanation: some multinational firms centralise some or all of their input 
purchasing at one location so as to achieve economics of bulk buying and many 
affiliates will have little autonomy in making purchasing decisions. In such 
circumstances, individual supplier may be the optimal supplier for a single FIE 
affiliates. 
f) Originality 
The results highlight the significant FDI linkage propensities of FIES whose 
originality is Hong Kong or Taiwan. However the results for other originalities 
are not statistically significant. 
g) Industry Characteristics 
FIEs in the industries of Food processing & manufacturing, Transport 
equipment manufacturing, and Ordinary machinery manufacturing are linked 
with higher FDI linkage propensity based on the analysis. While FIEs belong to 
Electronics or Pharmaceuticals have lower propensity of local procurement. 
Tests for other industries are not statistically significant in my estimation 
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results. In general, the results are in conformity with previous research with one 
exception of Transport equipment manufacturing. As mentioned above FIES in 
the Food processing L, manufacturing industries usually involve extensive 
supply linkage indigenous suppliers of raw and packaging materials. The result 
confirms this. The higher FDI linkage propensity of FIEs in Ordinary 
machinery manufacturing industry may result in the normally lower 
value-to-weight ratio of technologically complex inputs in this industry. While 
both Electronics and Pharmaceuticals are high tech industries, which need 
higher value-to-weight ratio of inputs, the comparatively lower FDI linkage 
propensity of FIEs in these industries is found. The exceptional higher local 
procurement propensity of Transport equipment manufacturing industry may 
be attributed to the 40 to 50 percent of "localisation" policy by Chinese 
government aiming at automobile industry (Xia and Lu, 2001). 
To shed more insights into what common characters of an industry affect 
FIES' local sourcing decision, based on an OECD sectoral classification (see 
Klette and Forre, 1995), the 36 2-digit sectors is aggregated into four groups, i. e. 
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high-tech, medium-high-tech, medium-low-tech and low tech. "' Tavares and 
Young (2001) use the different classification in their analogous study by 
grouping the manufacturing sectors into "global industries"" and "non-global 
industries". Those "global industries" are actually encompassed by the 
higher-tech groups (high-tech and medium-high-tech) of this study. Thus 
current classification more or less is also supported by theirs. Lower FDI linkage 
potential of FIEs in higher-tech industry and higher potential of FIEs in 
lower-tech industry are clearly performed in my estimation results. 
40 Accordingly, high-tech sectors are Aerospace, Computers & Office Machinery, Electronics & 
Communications, Pharmaceuticals; medium-high-tech sectors include Scientific Instruments, 
Electrical Machinery, Motor Vehicles, Chemicals, and Non-electrical Machinery; 
medium-low-tech sectors refer to Shipbuilding, Rubber and Plastic Equipment, Other 
Transport Equipment, Stone, Clay and Glass, Non-ferrous Metals, Other Manufacturing, and 
Fabricated Metal Products; low-tech sectors are Petroleum Refining, Ferrous Metals, Paper L 
printing, Textiles & Clothing, \Vood & Furniture, and Food & beverages. 
a` "Global industries" include Automobiles, Chemicals, Electronics, and Pharmaceuticals. 
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3.7 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Using unbalanced firm-level panel data for China and two-step fixed effect 
panel analysis procedure, current results are believed to be more effective and 
creditable than previous analyses based on cross sectional data and other 
estimation method. Apart from confirming some existing findings, this study 
not only develops them in depth, but also challenge previous notions as well. In 
the other direction, there are a series of important policy implications of this 
work for FDI linkage promotion activity. These implications could be two fold 
based on the two principal roles of FDI linkage. First, aiming at filtering 
valuable FDI (high linkage potential); second, relating to providing aftercare 
for existing investment in favour of local embeddedness. a2 
From the angle of helping the development of indigenous firms, targeting 
foreign investors with higher FDI linkage potential is an effective way to replace 
some frequently used measures for linkage promotion, because most of them 
like local content requirements are no longer permissible in the context of the 
Although Phelps and Fuller (2001) claim that already emphasis is moving from attracting 
inward investment to aftercare of existing investments in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, attracting FDI is still necessary to most of developing countries such as China. 
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WTO or other international agreements. According to my estimation results, 
the following factors could be considered for Chinese government to filter 
foreign investors with high FDI linkage potentials. 
a) FIES with net export contribution: As export is proved to be negatively 
associated with FDI linkage propensity, Chinese government should pursue 
more import-substituting investment rather than export-generating investment. 
To deal with this net export contribution is a more appropriate measure to 
value FIEs than gross export ability. 
b) FIEs established through joint ventures rather than Greenfield 
investment. 
c) FIEs with high strength other than big size: Since larger FIEs are proved 
to hold lower local sourcing potential while higher strength ones do not, current 
research questions targeting strategies should be based on the size of a FIE's 
rather than strength in terms of linkage quality. Further more, if the priority is 
local embeddedness, small FIEs may need more attention. 
d) Although FIEs from Hong Kong and Taiwan are proved to procure more 
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from Chinese owned suppliers, it can not be an evidence for country targeting 
promotion policy. An evolving doubtful view from the researchers of IMF, 
World Bank and other international institutions is that about a quarter or more 
of China's officially-recorded FDI is actually mainland Chinese money 
originally". These monies may flow out to access better financial, regulatory 
and legal services and take on a "round trip" by returning to China as apparent 
FDI to access the fiscal incentives and improved investor protection offered in 
Chin, to foreign investors. Analysts also point to the numerical coincidence 
(and rising share) of China's FDI inflows from Hong Kong, the British Virgin 
Islands and other tax havens and the outflows recorded as "errors and 
omissions" in China's balance of payments. From this point of view, the 
findings in this study that FIEs from Hong Kong and Taiwan have high 
potential of FDI linkage may result from those "round-trip" monies through 
Hong Kong or Taiwan but originally from mainland China. If so this finding has 
nothing to do with the objective of this study. Although there is still no solid 
evidence to back up this doubt, at least caution needs to be raised. 
" For details, see Gen. - Xiao (2004) 
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e) FIE affiliates with sourcing autonomy: policies favouring attracting FIE 
affiliates with sourcing autonomy can be advocated. 
As shown in this analysis, FIES usually need time to get familiar with the 
host market, and even those FIEs linked with indigenous suppliers may have 
chance to switch to foreign suppliers or importing. Thus besides those 5 factors 
mentioned above, the after care of those established FIEs is also an important 
issue to the host government. In addition, the findings of negative FDI linkage 
intention of high tech FIEs and large FIEs inform may come from the weak 
local supply base, thus to promote attracting high tech FDI and stimulate the 
embeddedness of existing investment, policies that favour strengthening local 
supplier base (availability, capacity and competitiveness) are advocated. These 
policies may include information and matchmaking, technology upgrading of 
local firms, human resource development programmes with local suppliers and 
other forms of training support, financial assistance, and cluster-oriented 
programmes (UNCTAD, 2001b) 
After two empirical studies, next chapter will try to examine the FDI 
administrating policies in terms of FDI Linkage creation from theoretical 
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perspective. 
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Chapter 4: FIES, Host Government, and FDI Linkage 
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4.1 Chapter Preamble 
The importance of FDI Linkage to the development of local economy has 
been empirically proved in Chapter 2. Then in Chapter 3, several factors have 
been found to have close link with the creation of FDI Linkage. The host 
government could strategically take these determinants into consideration as a 
filter when making FDI attracting policies. 
To shed light on the FDI administrating policies, this chapter will try to 
theoretically discover the interaction between FIEs and the host government 
focusing on the creation of FDI Linkage. In addition, the model will provide 
theoretical support to the empirical findings in Chapter 2. 
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4.2 Introduction 
It is well recognised that Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) are normally 
very sensitive to the change of host country policies implemented by the host 
government. Host governments may play a crucial role in attracting and guiding 
FIES' activities through their policies. Key policies might be adopted by host 
governments to act as incentives to the creation of FDI linkage. Such policies 
might comprise import restrictions, local content requirements or other soft 
incentives aimed at deepening the inter-firm relationships between foreign and 
local firms. But those policies like import restrictions and local content 
requirements are no longer permissible in the context of the WTO or other 
international agreements4'. Instead, an increasing number of countries have 
adopted soft policies to promote not only local sourcing but also the deepening 
of relationships between foreign and local firms 5. 
Following previous literature two questions of immediate interest could be 
raised. First, would the vertical technology transfer (VTT) from FIES to their 
4t Those policies have not been found to be very effective as well (Hackett and Srinivasan, 
1998). 
" For some examples, see the World Investment Report 2001, (UNCTAD, 2001a) 
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local suppliers inevitably happen if the FIE source locally? Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, how could the host government policies impact the sourcing 
choice of those FIEs which are already established in the host country? 
In general, a FIE faces the following conflicting incentives in the host 
country. On one hand, local sourcing seems more natural with comparison to 
importing when a FIE attempts to avoid any inconvenience that may caused by 
being away from suppliers such as the high delivery cost and importing tariff 
etc.; and in order to offset the weakness of those linked local suppliers against 
foreign suppliers FIEs would like to make VTT to local suppliers. On the other 
hand, it would be hard for FIEs to prevent local rivals from reaping the benefit 
from the "VTT leakage" as what has been proved in Chapter 2 as "indirect 
horizontal spillover", but this can be prevented by abandoning local sourcing 
while importing input from foreign suppliers. However, local sourcing of FIEs 
would be a preferable choice for the host government as analysed previously. It 
turns out that, in equilibrium, FIEs would choose to import input if the cost of 
competition arising from "VTT leakage" exceeds the importing cost. 
Through the following theoretical model, this study will focus on an 
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investigation of government policies or other conditions if possible under which 
FIEs prefer to source locally and impose VTT to local suppliers. Although 
relevant discussions are occasionally found in some case studies (see e. g. Barry 
and Bradley 1997, Buckley and Casson 1976), systematic study on this subject 
is still rare. Furthermore, the model will be able to provide support from the 
theoretical side to the empirical findings in Chapter 2. 
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4.3 Literature Review 
A voluminous informal as well as empirical body of literature exists on FDI 
backward linkages. For example, the 2001 issue of the World Investment Report 
was devoted entirely to the effects of foreign direct investment on backward 
linkages in host countries. However, theoretical models that explore the 
relationship between FIEs and backward linkages in the host country are rare. As 
argued by Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2003), most of the existing FDI linkage 
studies lack a tight link to theoretical models, thus their findings may be 
unconvincing. 
So far there exist only three theoretical studies which are relevant to FDI 
linkage: Rodriguez-Clare (1996), Markusen and Venables (1999) and Lin and 
Saggi (2004). All of their theoretical models provide important insights regarding 
the two-way relationship between FIES and supply linkages. Both models of 
Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and Markusen and Venables (1999) are based on the 
monopolistic competition in the host market. In both models, Ethier's (1982) 
formulation of the so called love-variety production function for final goods, which 
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is in turn derived from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), lies at the heart of the interaction 
between FIEs and local suppliers. Their models denote that the entry of FIEs can 
have profound effects on backward linkages, industrial development, and welfare of 
the host country. In addition, the Markusen and Venables (1999) model also allows 
for a competition effect wherein the entry of a multinational damages its local 
rivals. The Lin and Saggi (2004) model focuses on investigating how the nature of 
contractual relationships between multinational and their local suppliers affect the 
degree of backward linkages in the local industry. Their model is designed for 
oligopolistic competition in the host market. They find the exclusivity contractual 
agreement between multinationals and their local suppliers could lead to 
de-linking effect, which makes the intermediate goods market less competitive due 
to market separation and causes the total output of the intermediate goods to 
shrink. 
According to the existing literature, there are at least four main areas 
identified that deserve further research to be carried out: 
" Existing theoretical literature has not addressed the sourcing choice of 
FIEs between importing and local sourcing. Although the analytical 
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literature on FDI linkage and spillover is vast (See Blalock and Gertler, 
2002 and Javorick, 2004), most of the literature merely dedicates to 
studying the spillover of FDI linkage (stated in Study One of current 
research). As far as this topic is concerned, no one has investigated the 
force behind FDI linkage creation, or in other words, how FIEs make the 
choice between importing and local sourcing. Thus, this study 
complements existing research by providing an analysis of how a FIE 
makes sourcing choice according to the circumstances of the host economy. 
" Few literature systematically studied the reaction of FIEs to the host 
government policies despite it is widely accepted that the behaviour of 
FIES' is very sensitive to the host government policies. Furthermore, under 
the increasingly liberalised world economic circumstances", how to affect 
the sourcing choice of FIEs and promote FDI linkage through policies 
implemented by the host government is vital to the host countries. The 
following model will uncover this to complement existing research. 
" As noted in Chapter 3, some frequently used measures to promote linkage, like local content 
requirements are no longer permissible in the context of the WVTO or other international 
agreements. 
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" Existing theoretical literature has not adequately analysed the 
mechanisms behind FDI spillover. Although some recent empirical studies 
appear to involve them, their findings are criticised due to lack of support 
from theoretical model. To improve it, the model developed below will 
consider all known possible mechanisms of FDI spillover, i. e. horizontal, 
vertical, indirect horizontal spillover of FDI are all taken into account. 
40 Most of the theoretical literature on FDI Linkage has ignored strategic 
interaction among firms with the exception of Lin and Saggi (2004) despite 
the evidence that firms are quite responsive to each others' choices. 
Current model will consider the creation of FDI Linkage in an oligopolistic 
environment rather than in a monopolistic competition model. 
Whilst challenging existing research, current study will make a contribution to 
balance out all issues mentioned above. 
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4.4 Methodology 
A model is developed as a two-stage dynamic game of complete but 
imperfect information. The key features of this type of game are that moves 
occur in sequence for each stage, simultaneous moves are allowed within stages, 
all previous moves are observed before the next move is chosen, and the 
players' payoffs from each feasible combination of moves are common 
knowledge. 
Suppose that there are two main roles in the game, a game leader as a 
dominant player and some game followers as subordinate players, then, 
equilibrium is obtained if the game leader can commit itself to an action before 
the other players (e. g. before the followers knowing all the parameters of the 
game, the leader can predict the responses of the followers and this knowledge 
is used in deciding his own action). The game followers choose their best actions 
after observing the leader's action. To be specified in this model, the game will 
include the following players: government of the host country, FIE producer 
(denoted by f ), local producer (denoted by h), local supplier (denoted by s) 
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and foreign supplier (denoted by sf ). From hereon, "producer" refers to the 
final product producer and "supplier" refers to the intermediate product 
producer. The sequence of moves is as follows: 
" First, the government decides its policy strategy noting that two types 
of government policies are assessed in this model, i. e. international trade 
policy and industrial policy. The policies will be strategically combined 
in order to fulfil the government's administrating objective (maximizing 
total welfare of the host country). 
" Second, the FIE producer chooses between three alternatives. Under a 
local arms length arrangement (market interaction), it simply buys the 
intermediate from the local supply market as an anonymous buyer. But 
it also can choose to provide the technological know-how and 
information to its local supplier that improves the productivity of the 
suppliers and lowers the cost of intermediate supply (or improves the 
quality of intermediate). This knowledge exchange is referred as vertical 
technology transfer (VTT). Alternatively, it can abandon local sourcing 
while import inputs from foreign supplier. 
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" Then, both local and foreign suppliers react using the amount of output 
produced to optimize their objective (maximising profit). 
The dynamic game will be solved by using an approach in the spirit of 
backwards induction. The first step in working backwards from the end of the 
game (the second stage) involves solving a simultaneous-move game for the 
FIE producer's sourcing choice given each feasible policy choice of host 
government in Stage One (Chapter 2). Then the optimal policy choice of host 
government belonging to the first stage will be solved with the anticipation of 
all firms' behaviour in the second stage. Finally the objective of this model 
will be achieved by understanding how the government's optimal policy 
strategy affects the optimal sourcing choice of a FIE and the market structure 
in the host country. The second stage game will be solved in the following 
section as the first step of backward induction to find out the FIE's response 
to any policy choices of host government. 
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4.5 The Model 
A two-tier partial equilibrium model is developed in this study, in which the 
production of final goods requires intermediate goods and the attention is 
focused on a single industry. The market structure is oligopolistic since FIEs 
mostly operate in oligopolistic industries (see I\Iarkusen, 1995). The interest lies 
in examining the interaction relationship between the policies of the host 
government and the sourcing decision of a FIE that produces the final goods in 
a host country. Facing the policies implemented by the host government, the 
FIE chooses between sourcing inputs from local supplier and from foreign 
supplier through importing. Moreover, it chooses whether to make the vertical 
technology transfer to its local supplier if importing input is abandoned. 
As mentioned above, two types of government policies are weighed up in 
this model, i. e. international trade policy and industrial policy. The instrument 
employed for international trade policy is an import tariff t, while industrial 
policy is implemented through taxes r. Although government usually applies 
an "income" tax on the profit of each firm in practice, to simplify the model, let 
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T denote the "effective tax rate" on production, thus the host government's 
income tax over a firm becomes T= -rq , where q 
is the amount of 
production of the firm. Note that the import tariff t is constrained to be 
non-negative and the tax rate T is constrained to be non-negative and less 
than one i. e. 0<T<1, so as to prevent tax rates that confiscate output from 
the firms. This is due to the fact that the basic premise for a government to 
impose tax is to keep non-negative profits for all firms in the country. 
The marginal cost of a producer equals the sum of the price of intermediate 
goods (given by w >0), the unit cost of transforming the input into the final 
product (given by c> 0), and the income tax. The demand function for final 
product is assumed to be linear p(q) =a-, ßq and all producers are assumed 
to compete in the Cournot fashion. The FIEs' (including both producer and 
supplier) marginal cost of transforming the intermediate goods is (1 - 6)c , 
where 6E [0,1] measures the degree of its cost advantage over local firms, since 
FIEs are assumed to have technological advantages over their local rivals. This 
assumption hardly needs defence. In fact, the theory of the multinational firm 
itself is built on the premise that multinational rely on intangible assets such as 
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superior technology to successfully compete with local firms that are better 
acquainted with the host country environment (Markusen, 1995). A wealth of 
evidence indicates that multinationals usually possess technologies that are 
superior to those of local firms in developing countries (see I\Iarkusen, 1995; 
Moran, 1998; and Saggi, 2002). 
As a benchmark, the market equilibrium is firstly described in the case that 
FIE producer sources input from local supplier but without VTT. 
4.5.1 The Benchmark Case: Local Sourcing but No VTT (Vertical Technology 
Transfer) 
Denote the aggregate quantity of production in the final product market by 
Q, then Q=of-ýq,, (4.1). 
Given the demand function of p(Q) =a -/3Q =p 
(q1, q,, ) as assumed above, 
FIE producer's profit function (payoff) is given by 
7rf(4>>4I+) = of 
lp(4f, 
4l, ) -w -T - (1- 6) c] (4.2); 
Local producer's payoff function is given by 
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rf(4f, gh) = qh 
[P(4>>Qh) 
-w -T - c, (4.3) 
FIE producer chooses its output q1 to maximize its profit taking q,, 
'as given 
max Ir f 4f, 4iß 
(4.4) 
0<qf <x 
Solving the first order condition for this problem has 
a-ßq, ß -W-T of - 2,6 
(4.5) 
Likewise, the feasible qh chosen by local producer is 
a-, 8qfi -w -T -c 
4n = 2,3 
(4.6) 
Solving (4.5) and (4.6) yields the output quantities simultaneously chosen by 
both FIE and local producer: 
Qf _ 
a-w-_r-(1-25)c 
Vh - 
-w-T-(1-FS)c (4.7) 
3,6 3, Q 
Using the aggregate production function specified in equation(4.1), it derives a 
demand curve for the intermediate goods: 
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w=a-T-C+'26C-%, 3QD (4.8) 
Since only one local supplier is designed in the upstream sector, the aggregate 
quantity of intermediate supply Qs = of . 
The profit of local supplier is 
calculated as: 
7ra(g1) = g8[w(q3)-wl -T -c] (4.9) 
where wl denotes the unit price of input for intermediate production. 
Calculating the first order condition over qq to maximise its profit can derive 
the equilibrium output of the local supplier 
2a-4T-4c+Sc-2w, 
_ = Qs 4s = 6,3 
(4.10) 
Then solving the equilibrium between demand and supply of intermediate 
(QD = Qs) yields the equilibrium price of intermediate: 
2a+2w, +Sc 
4 
(4.11) 
With the equilibrium price of intermediate w' , the equilibrium production 
quantity of FIE producer is easily calculated: 
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2a-2w, -4T-4c+76c 4f = 12ß 
(4.12) 
Similarly, the equilibrium production quantity chosen non-cooperatively and 
simultaneously by the local producer equals: 
*_ 2a-2w, -4T-4c-55c qh 
12/3 
(4.13) 
Comparing the equation (4.12) with (4.13), it shows that the FIE produces 
larger quantity of product than its local rivals and holds higher market share 
because of its cost-advantage. And similarly calculating (4.12)/(4.13) can 
derive the market segmentation between foreign and local firms in the final 
product market. Obviously, the FIE producer's market share increases with the 
technology gap between FIEs over local firms. 
Leinina 1: The higher the technology advantage 6 of the FIE over local 
firms, the bigger market share the FIE producer would take. 
Given both producers' output, the equilibrium profit of FIE producer can 
be calculated: 
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. 
(2a - 2w, - 4T - 4c + 76c)2 7r(4.14) J= l44ß 
Similarly the profit of local producer equals: 
7r. - 
(2a - 2w1 - 4T - 4c - 56c)2 (4.15) 
ý` 144,3 
Inspection of the above shows that the profit of local producer decreases with 
the FIE's cost advantage J. Together with Lemma 1, it is concluded that the 
higher the FIE's cost advantage 6, the more negative competition effect the 
local producer suffers. Thus the FIE has the upper hand in the competition 
with local producer. 
Proposition 1: Local firms suffer from the competition with FIE rivals due 
to the weak technology level, and the larger is the technology gap between local 
firms and their FIE rivals, the more will the local firms suffer. 
In addition, the equilibrium profit of local supplier can be derived as: 
(2a-2w, -4r-4c+Sc ý, = 24Q 
(4.16) 
Let the aggregate level of output of the intermediate goods measure the degree 
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of backward linkage (B9°) under benchmark case of local sourcing but no 
VTT: 
Q 2a - 2w, - 47- - 4c + Sc BL = QD = GQ 
(4.17) 
Although the local producer suffers from the technology advantage of FIE's 
and thus lowers the demand of intermediate for the local supplier, equation 
(4.17) shows that a net demand creation effect of the FIE's technology 
advantage to the upstream industry still exists. Similar result can be found in 
Lin and Saggi (2004) as wvell. 
Remark 1: The demand creation effect increases with the technology 
advantage of FIE over local rival. 
The issue now is whether the above results hold when the FIE opts to 
provide VTT to its local supplier. To explore the reaction of all firms' (in both 
final and intermediate production sectors) to the appearance of VTT, let us 
now study the game with the VTT from FIE producer to its local supplier. 
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4.5.2 Local Sourcing with VTT 
Before deriving the sub-game perfect equilibrium of this game, further 
details about the assumption with regard to VTT need to be presented. As 
discussed above, FIES often transfer technology to their local suppliers and help 
upgrade their production methods. VTT is modelled as a reduction in the 
marginal cost for transforming input of the supplier from c to c-d where 
the parameter d captures the degree of VTT. In this situation, the local 
supplier's marginal cost of production equals w, +T+c-d. 
Solving the first order condition on q, to maximise the profit of the local 
supplier yields: 
2a - 47- - 4c + bc - 2w, + 2d _Qs. 6Q - 
(4.18) 4.. - 
Then solving the equilibrium between demand and supply of intermediate 
QD = Qs) yields the equilibrium price of intermediate: 
2a+2w, +be-2d 
4 
(4.19) 
With the equilibrium price of intermediate w*, the equilibrium production 
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quantity of FIE producer is easily calculated: 
2a-2w 4T-4c+2d+Tbc 
41 =1 12,6 
(4.20) 
Similarly, the equilibrium production quantity of local producer equals: 
2a-2w, -4T-4c+2d-56c (4.21) qh = 12, Q 
Then the equilibrium profit of FIE producer can be calculated as: 
. 
(2a-2w, -4T-4c+2d+7Sc)2 7r(4.22) f= 144ß 
Comparing (4.22) with (4.14), the profit of the FIE producer's under the 
benchmark case of local sourcing but no VTT, it is shown that vertical 
technology transfer to the local supplier is a dominant strategy for the FIE 
producer. And the more VTT, the more profit the FIE could benefit from it. 
Thus the FIE producer would like to maximise the technology transfer, which is 
denoted as d= Sc. 
Lemma 2: The FIE producer prefers transferring technology to its local 
supplier as much as possible if maximising profit is the sole administration goal. 
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The equilibrium profit of local producer equals: 
ý. _ 
(2a-2w, - 4rr - 4c + 2d - 55c)2 (4.23) r`- 144ß 
This time comparing (4.23) with (4.15), it is clear that the profit of the local 
producer increases with the appearance of FIE's VTT. If considering the 
competition between the FIE and local producers from the aspect of market 
segmentation by comparing the quotient of (4.20)/(4.21) under VTT with that 
of (4.12)/(4.13) under non-VTT, it is demonstrated that the market share of 
FIE's decreases with the increase of VTT. Both points above denote that as the 
rival of FIE producer, local producers could benefit from the VTT from FIEs to 
local suppliers. 
Lemma 3: Local firms could benefit from the creation of backward linkages 
of FIEs in the same industry with local suppliers in the upstream industry if 
VTT provided by FIEs exists. 
The result is intuitive. The local producer will benefit as well from lower 
cost (or higher quality) of inputs provided by the local supplier if the local 
supplier benefit from the VTT provided by the FIE producer. It is called as 
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"indirect horizontal spillover" (noting that it has been empirically analysed in 
the study one) since the spillover is from the FIE producer in the same industry 
and the transfer channel is indirect. This is consistent with the findings in study 
one that there exist "FDI indirect horizontal spillovers". Be aware that the FIE 
producer still holds upper hand in the final product market both by profit and 
market share although its local rival is strengthened through the VTT. 
Lenuna 4: FIEs have to face a trade-off as follows. On one hand, FIEs 
benefit from cutting down the intermediate cost by providing VTT to their 
local suppliers; on the other hand, however, VTT by FIEs also indirectly 
benefits their local rivals. 
The profit of local supplier in equilibrium equals: 
(2a - 2w1 - 4T - 4c + 2d + 6c)2 7r = 24Q 
(4.24) 
And the equilibrium degree of backward linkage (BL') under the case of local 
sourcing with VTT equals: 
BL° =Q = 
2a-2w, -4r-4c+2d+Sc (4.25) 
D 6/3 
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Comparing both (4.24) with (4.16) and (4.25) with (4.17), the local supplier 
is better off when obtaining the VTT from the FIE customer. The intuition 
behind is simple: not only there is no cost for the local supplier to obtain VTT, 
but also the demand for its product can increase consequently. 
Let us next examine the reactions of all firms in the host country when the 
FIE decides to abandon local sourcing but import intermediate input from 
foreign supplier. 
4.5.3 Importing Intermediate 
Nov let us contend with the case that when FIE producer decides to import 
intermediate input from foreign supplier only but the linkage still exists 
between local producer and supplier. The focus will be the changes of the 
market structure both in upstream and downstream sectors because of the 
withdrawal of the FIE producer from local sourcing. 
In this situation, the price the FIE pays for the intermediate will generally 
differ from the price paid by local producer since they have distinctively 
different suppliers, foreign supplier in the overseas supply market and local 
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supplier respectively. Let w1 and w, denote the unit price of the intermediate 
paid by the FIE to its foreign supplier and that paid by the local producer to its 
local supplier. The biggest difference from previous analysis is in the 
intermediate supply side. For the purpose of simplicity, foreign supplier is 
assumed to use same input to produce intermediate as local supplier thus pay 
the same price of w, for a unit of input. But it is also assumed that foreign 
supplier holds the cost advantage of 6 over local supplier which is the same as 
the FIE producer over the local producer. In addition, foreign supplier has to 
pay income tax to foreign government by the rate of -rf and import tariff to 
host government by the rate of t. Furthermore, as Rodriguez-Clare (1996) 
notes, producer services (such as banking, auditing, consulting, wholesale 
services, transportation, machine repair etc. ) are non-tradable goods and 
proximity between suppliers and producers is convenient. Thus additional unit 
cost of 0 is also considered in this case to cover the expenditure because of the 
possible inconvenience mentioned above. Then the marginal cost of production 
for the FIE producer and foreign supplier equals wf+T+ (1 - b) c+0 and 
w, + rf +t+ (1 - 6) c respectively. The Cournot competition in the final 
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product market yields the equilibrium output for both the FIE and local 
producer: 
a+wh-2wf-T-c+26c-2cb 
qf = 3,3 
(4.26) 
a+wf-2w-T-c-Sc (4.27) 4ý+ = 3Q 
Rewriting the above two equations in terms of prices gives the derived demand 
curves for import intermediate and local intermediate respectively: 
wf =. L (a+wk --r-c+26c-20-3PQD) (4.28) 
w,, = 2(a+wf -T-c-Sc+0-3, QQD) (4.29) 
where QDJ and Qo, I 
denote the demand quantity for import and local 
intermediate respectively. Since only one foreign supplier is designed in the 
overseas supply sector, the aggregate quality of import intermediate supply 
Qsf = q, f , where q, f represents the output of the foreign supplier. The profit of 
foreign supplier is calculated as: 
7r.., (4, f)=q., f[ f(g9f)-wl-Tf-t-(1-6)c] (4.30) 
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Calculating the first order condition over q`f to maximise its profit can derive 
the equilibrium output of the foreign supplier: 
a+wh--r-2Tf-2cß, -2t-3c+4bc-2q i 4.31 4.., f = 6,6 = 
Qsf ) 
Then solving the equilibrium between demand and supply of import 
intermediate (QDf = Qs/) yields the equilibrium price of import intermediate: 
a+w,, +2w1-T+2T1+2t+c-20 (4.32) 
4 
Similarly, the equilibrium price of local intermediate can be derived: 
=a+ 
wf +2w, +T+c-6c-q 
wý' 
4 
(4.33) 
Solving (4.32) and (4.33) yields both the equilibrium import and local 
intermediate price as follows: 
_ 
5a+10w1 +3T+2T1 +2t+5c-45c-G0 
Wh 
15 
(4.34) 
*_ 5a+10w1-3T+8T1+8t+5c-6c-90 wf 
15 
(4.35) 
With the equilibrium price of intermediate w,, and w; , the equilibrium 
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production quantity of both FIE producer and foreign supplier is easily 
calculated: 
10a-lOwl -6rr-14r - 14t - 20c + 286c - 180 
of = q. 4f = 45,6 
(4.36) 
Similarly, the equilibrium production quantity of both local producer and local 
supplier equals: 
10a-10w1 -24r+4Tf+4t-20c-86c+3¢ 4h = 45r+ = 45,3 
(4.37) 
Then the equilibrium profit of the FIE producer is calculated as: 
ý; _ 
4a-4w1 -6T- 
9 
2Tf-2t-8c+46cxqf 
(4.38) 
The equilibrium profit of local producer: 
7, = 
4a-4w1-6T-2rf-2t-8c+48c+30 
x qj, 4.39 9 
The equilibrium profit of local supplier: 
5a-5w1-12T+2T1+2t-10c-48c-60 
(4.40) 7F x* 95ra - A 15 
And the degree of backward linkage (BL') under the case that the FIE 
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producer import intermediate from foreign supplier: 
BLI = 
10a -10w1 - 24T + 4T f+ 4t - 20c - 88c + 30 (4.41) 
45ß 
Since the equilibrium profit of the FIE under all three regimes (local 
sourcing with non-VTT, local sourcing with VTT, and importing) has been 
derived, it is now in a position to describe the sub-game perfect equilibrium in 
the second stage of the entire game. 
4.5.4 Second Stage Equilibrium 
Based on the three sub-games studied above, it is identified that the 
sub-game perfect equilibrium of the sourcing game depends on the comparison 
of irr ,f and 7r 
j. Because 7rB < ý" , together with 
Lemma 2,3 and 4, the 
following results can be concluded: 
Proposition 2: The FIE producer would always prefer providing VTT to its 
local supplier, but the extent of VTT would depend on its strategy towards the 
market segmentation and the competition with local rival. 
Regarding the choice between local sourcing and importing, Lemma. 5 is 
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concluded. 
Lemma 5: The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the sourcing game is 
local sourcing or importing, depends on whether or not f< 7r f. 
The basic trade-off faced by the FIE producer is as follows. As what has 
been rectified by now, there are two advantages to local sourcing. First, the 
proximity to supplier would be convenient to the production process and 
reduces the cost of the FIE. Second, through vertical technology transfer the 
FIE could further reduce the input cost. The disadvantage of local sourcing over 
importing is that it would be hard for the FIE to prevent its local rivals reaping 
the benefit from the "VTT leakage" as what has been proved in study one, but 
this can be precluded by importing input from foreign supplier while 
abandoning local sourcing. Depending on the host government' policies and 
other parameters value, either sourcing mode can be optimal for the FIE 
producer. From previous analysis, it is obvious that local sourcing is preferred 
by the host country. Now that the conditions that imply equilibrium decisions 
for all firms under three cases in the second stage game has been specified, the 
first stage game will be solved to derive the optimal policies for the host 
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government. 
. 
4.6 Government Optimal Policies 
It is assumed that maximising the total welfare of the host country (noted 
as IV) is the main basic objective of the host government although some 
political sub-objectives may co-exist such as the long term development of local 
firms and the promotion of FIEs' local sourcing etc. 
Host country total welfare W is the sum of consumer's surplus, local firms' 
production surplus and host government's revenue of import tariff and income 
tax: 
IV= IP (Q) dQ - P*Qt + 7s +7n +T (ql*, + q, + q; ) + tgs1 (4.42) 
Using the equilibrium results (4.34)-(4.40) under the case of importing, the 
total welfare iV ` can be calculated. As discussed above, in this model T and t 
are the policy tools that the host government could implement to impact the 
behaviours of the firms in the host country. The feasible policy strategy should 
be the combination of (T, t) that can maximise the total welfare of the host 
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country 1V' . 
Calculating the first order condition of 117, over tax rate r with the given 
t, we can have the most feasible industrial policy as a policy combination with 
each international trade policy imposed by the host government: 
-125a + 465c + 125w1 - 68t - 23Tf + 250c 
132 
(4.43) 
The key point shown in the above equation is that the optimal tax rater 
decreases in import tariff t, which denotes that if the host government employs 
a tighter international trade policy by increasing import tariff, it will be better 
off if there is a looser industrial policy imposed by reducing tax rate. Seemingly 
the host government could urge the FIE producer to source intermediate from 
local supplier solely by imposing high import tariff; however, from equation 
(4.43) it becomes logical that without considering an appropriate correspondent 
adjustment on the tax rate it would inevitably hurt the total welfare of the host 
country. 
Proposition 3: Host government has to keep a balance between its 
international trade and industrial policies. 
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4.6.1 Effect of the Host Goveriunent Policies on FIE's Sourcing Choice 
As claimed in Lemma 5, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the 
sourcing game is local sourcing or importing, depending on whether or not 
7rf < 7rf". In other words if 0>0 (let 0= ýTý - 71ß ), the FIE would prefer 
local sourcing; on the contrary if 0<0 the FIE would choose to import 
intermediate input. And the lower is A, the higher possibility the FIE chooses 
to import. Counting on parameter values, either sourcing choice can be optimal 
for the FIE producer. To further explore the impact of the government policies 
on a FIE's sourcing choice, I will try to simplify the model and focus the 
spotlight on the interaction between the FIE's sourcing choice and the host 
government's policies. 
It is assumed that the only objective the FIE holds in the host country is to 
maximise profit, thus as claimed in Lemma 2 when the FIE source intermediate 
locally it will transfer technology to its local supplier as much as possible so 
that d= Sc . 
The foreign supplier is assumed to be under the system of 
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refunding taxes on exported goods so that -rf = 0. 
From (4.43), we can derive the feasible policy combination of (-r, t) as 
follows: 
-125a + 465c + 125w1 - 68t + 250c T= 
132 
(4.44) 
Calculating the first order partial differential equation of 0 over import 
tariff t, we can have 
aA 
_ 
32t + 53624 (a - wl - 2c) - 370165c (4.45) 
at 156816)3 
The sign of ý° denotes the orientation of the FIE's sourcing choice to the 
adjustment of import tariff t. If ý° > 0, the increase of import tariff t would 
increase the FIE's profit under local sourcing while decrease its profit under 
importing, thus lead the FIE to choose local sourcing; vice versa, if 2< <0 the 
increase of import tariff would lead the FIE to choose importing. Let 
46276c - 6703 (a - w1 2c) k=4 (4.46), then if t>k Lit >0 while if 
t<k, ý< < 0. Apparently, the reaction of FIE's local sourcing potential to the 
change of host government policy t depends on the value of k. 
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Off k<0t>k I- >0 (Note that the optimal import tariff is 
restricted in the sense of t> 0) 
"If k>0 and t>ký 2°>0 
while t<k<0 
From (4.46) we can find that the sign of k mainly depends on the value of 
6 and a relative to other parameters, suppose that 6 denotes the 
technology advantage of the foreign firm over local firm and a denotes the 
market size of the host country. In the situation that the market size of the host 
country is small and the technology gap between local firm and foreign firm is 
large, wherein k will be higher than zero, then how the FIE makes sourcing 
choice will depend on whether t>k or not. This result is different from 
general notion and need to be noticed in practice. In practice increasing import 
tariff used to be employed by the host government as a most convenient tool to 
promote FIES' local sourcing. But the finding of this model tells us that this 
tool may not work and it depends on various factors such as the technology gap 
between local firm and foreign firm as well as the market size of the host 
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country. 
Lemma 6: If the situations that the market size of the host country is small 
and foreign firms hold large technology advantage over local firms, the host 
government should employ very tight international trade policy like high 
import tariff to guarantee this policy works. 
Proposition 4: How the FIE makes sourcing choice in accordance with the 
adjustment of import tariff by the host government will depend on the economy 
position of the host country such as its market size, technology gap and the 
development of local firms. 
4.6.2 Local Firins' Development and FIEs' Sourcing Choice 
It is widely accepted that the improvement of local firms will promote local 
sourcing of FIE's. In this model it means that reducing the technology gap of 
local firms from foreign firms could increase the FIE's local sourcing propensity 
in this model. Now let us investigate whether the development of local firms 
could affect FIES' sourcing choice. Calculating the first order partial differential 
equation of 0 over technology gap 6 can have 
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aQ 
_ 
43849c2 5 -102301c (a - w, - 2c) - 18508ct (4.47) 
ab 784O8, ß 
The sign of denotes the orientation of the FIE's sourcing choice to the VIN 
technology improvement of local firms (lowering6 ). If ýh > 0, the decrease of 
technology gap Swould decrease the FIE's profit under local sourcing while 
increase its profit under importing, thus induce the FIE to choose importing; 
vice versa, ift <0 the decrease of technology gap would lead the FIE to 
choose local sourcing. Let m= 
18508t + 102301 (a - w' 2c) (4.48), then if 
43849c 
S>m, ý° > 0; while if 6<m, ýs < 0. Thus the reaction of the FIE's local 
sourcing potential to the technology improvement of local firms depends on the 
comparison between the values of 6 and m. 
"If m>1S<m °"° <0 (Note that the technology gap 6 is 
restricted as 0<6<1 in this model 
*If m<1 and S>M=. A, >0 
while 6<m =* J3 <0 
Since the market size parameter a is usually substantial relative to other 
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parameters, the result of m>16<m=°<0 should hold in most cases 
so that the technology improvement of local firms could induce the FIE 
producer to source input locally as expected. 
Leimaa 7: Normally the technology improvement of local firms could induce 
the FIE producer to source input locally 
However, it has to be admitted that the statement in Lemma 7 does not 
always hold. Thinking of an extreme situation, where the market size of the 
host country is very small, the import tariff is very low and the technology gap 
is huge (6 > m), the above lemma would become invalid. This in conjunction 
with Lemma, 6 and Lemma 7, derive the proposition as follows: 
Proposition 5: The technology improvement of local firms' could induce 
FIEs to choose local sourcing, except that the host government persists in 
imposing low import tariff while neglecting the small size of the host market 
and the disadvantage of local firms' from foreign firms. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
The model developed in this section contributes to the literature on FDI in 
two main aspects. First, while it is widely accepted that the policies imposed by 
the host government is an important factor that could affect the decision 
making of the FIEs in the host country, there are only few related case studies 
in place in previous literature. Through a dynamic game model, in this section 
this study theoretically investigated the impact of host government's policies on 
a FIE's sourcing choice. It is found that (1) the host government should make 
efforts to the development of local firms, which would not only benefit local 
firms to increase competition power when facing FIE rivals, but also -attract 
more FIEs to source inputs locally; (2) the adjustment of the FDI policies 
imposed by host government needs to take into account the circumstance of the 
host economy; (3) the host government should keep a balance between its 
international trade policy and industrial policy. 
The second contribution of this model lies in providing support from the 
theoretical side to the findings in Study One of current research. It is found that 
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(1) FIES prefer providing vertical technology transfer to their local suppliers, 
but the extent of technology transfer depends on their strategies to the market 
segmentation and the competition with local rivals; (2) local firms including 
both suppliers and producers benefit from the spillovers of FDI if FIES source 
inputs locally. Specifically, local suppliers in the upstream sectors benefit from 
vertical spillovers of FDI and local producers benefit from indirect horizontal 
spillovers of FDI even as rivals with FIEs. These theoretical findings are 
consistent with the empirical results in Study One (Chapter 2). 
170 
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Policy Implications 
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5.1 Chapter Preamble 
This chapter seeks to review the main objectives of the research identified in 
Chapter 1 and summarises the findings of the research in the context of these 
objectives. It discusses whether the research objectives have been achieved and 
what the shortcomings are. It reviews the revolution of FDI policies in China 
and then discusses the extent to which the findings can be applied to the policy 
making practice in China in order to maximise the benefit from inward FDI. It 
finally identifies some key areas for further research. 
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5.2 Research Objectives Review 
As stated in Chapter 1, there are four specific objectives that are initially 
proposed for current research. 
a) To investigate the existence of productivity externalities from FIEs to 
indigenous Chinese firms in China and to explore channels or mechanisms 
through which they could occur; 
b) To discover the possible determinants of the mechanisms that could 
induce positive productivity externalities from FIEs to indigenous Chinese 
firms; 
c) To examine the interaction between the host government and FIEs; 
d) To improve the existing FDI promotion tools and policies or develop new 
ones for policy makers in China to effectively maximise the benefit China 
could reap from FDI in the circumstances of globalisation and liberalisation. 
The whole research process is strictly designed based on these objectives. 
With two empirical studies and one theoretical study of the main body of this 
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thesis, all objectives are elaborated into details and met. Respectively, 
Objective a) is studied in Chapter 2; Objective b) is investigated in Chapter 3; 
Objective c) is examined in Chapter 4; and Objective d) is considered through 
all studies of current research. 
174 
5.3 Findings and Original Contributions 
Using a self-collected panel data set of foreign and indigenous Chinese 
manufacturing firms from 1999 to 2003, Chapter 2 investigates whether 
productivity spillovers from FDI to indigenous Chinese firms exist and tries to 
uncover the FDI spillover channels. Different from the existing literature, this 
study incorporates a previously neglected channel of indirect horizontal 
externalities and what is believed to be a better measure of FDI Backward 
Linkage into the spillover channel system for the first time. 
In addition to confirming the negative horizontal effect of FIEs' on 
indigenous Chinese firms in the same industry, Chapter 2 has empirically 
proven the importance of FDI Backward Linkage (FDI Linkage) to the 
development of indigenous manufacturing firms in China. First, the FDI 
Linkage could raise output of linked indigenous suppliers. Second, FDI Linkage 
could be powerful channels for diffusing knowledge and skills from FIEs to their 
indigenous suppliers. Another significant finding of Chapter 2 is that the FDI 
Linkage could even lead positive horizontal spillover to indigenous firms in the 
same industry ("Indirect Horizontal Externality"). In other words, the creation 
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of FDI Linkage could help offset the negative competition effect of FIEs' on 
indigenous firms in the same industry. It is worth noting that these empirical 
results are consistent with the theoretical findings in Chapter 4. 
The heterogeneity of firms in terms of absorptive capacity is also given 
consideration in the study of Chapter 2. It is found that non-SOEs perform 
better than SOEs as the former have higher incentives to learn and imitate from 
FIEs in Chinese manufacturing industry. It is also found that indigenous 
exporting firms are more likely to benefit from FDI spillovers. 
After confirming the importance of FDI Linkage, Chapter 3 involves 
analysing the determinants of FDI Linkage. This empirical study extends the 
existing findings by focusing on four issues that are likely to play an important 
role but neglected in previous literature, namely measure bias of the FDI 
Linkage, firm heterogeneity, linkage quality, and appropriate methodology. 
Firstly both two types of normally used measures of FDI Linkage may not 
accurately reflect the magnitude of a FIE's linkage with indigenous suppliers. It 
is argued that the findings through applying those traditional measures could 
be misleading. Therefore the main body of the empirical analysis will employ a 
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better measure of FDI Linkage. Secondly the unique data set, which includes 
panel information of 527 manufacturing FIES from 2003 to 2005, allows me to 
reap the advantages of panel data analysis such as more accurate inference of 
estimation and controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity etc 47 . 
Thirdly the issue of linkage quality is considered in my analysis. To the best of 
my knowledge, it is the first time for empirical work to touch on this issue. 
Finally the application of the so-called "two-step fixed effect panel analysis 
procedure" makes the estimation of time-constant variables practicable while 
still benefits from the merits of panel fixed effect analysis. 
With these exclusive features, it is believed the results of current research 
are more effective and creditable than ever. Several factors are empirically 
proven to be closely related to the creation of FDI Linkage. This could provide 
guidance to the FDI attracting policies implemented by Chinese government if 
the objective of creating FDI Linkage is brought on to the round table. 
After the two empirical studies, Chapter 4 involves a theoretical study. As 
argued by Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2003), most existing FDI research is 
17 For details, see Cheng Hsiao (2003). 
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deficient in a tight link to theoretical models, which results in some 
unpersuasive conclusions. Therefore, an analysis of the two-stage dynamic 
game model in Chapter 4 may shed light from theoretical side to the topic of 
FDI Linkage especially to those exclusive issues like "Indirect Horizontal 
Externality" that are addressed in the above two empirical studies. On the 
other hand, this theoretical model complements existing literature by 
investigating the interaction between FIEs and host government focusing on the 
creation of FDI Linkage. The findings are vital to the formulation of host 
country's FDI administrating policies. 
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5.4 Policy and Managerial Implications 
Besides the academic contribution of current research stated above, the 
findings have important managerial and policy implications as well. 
5.4.1 Self-upgrading of Local Firins 
While it has been proven empirically and theoretically in current research 
that backward linkages between FIES and indigenous suppliers can improve the 
productivity of the indigenous manufacturing sector in a developing country, 
the tendency for FIEs to source inputs from indigenous suppliers essentially 
depends on the capabilities of indigenous suppliers. 
To absorb and benefit more from such externalities, indigenous firms must 
have a certain level of technological capability and management skills. Local 
suppliers in developing countries have to compete against both overseas 
suppliers and global suppliers. The previous lower domestic market supplier 
standards in developing countries have to be replaced by international 
standards, putting a strong pressure on suppliers of parts and components to 
approach the new standards of price, quality and timely delivery. If the local 
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FIES do not move fast in the upgrading direction or if the barriers of entry are 
insurmountable such suppliers will be replaced by imports or by the 
global-in-place suppliers mentioned above. Additionally, a commitment of top 
management to quality upgrading is also inevitable. As researched by Yoon 
(1994) and Belderbos et al. (2001), the "right attitude" is often regarded by 
some FIEs as more important character than the actual level of quality at any 
given point in time. Thus to facilitate indigenous Chinese firms to benefit from 
FDI Linkage, current research suggests: 
" Indigenous Chinese firms in developing countries should not be 
short-sightedly putting a high premium on short-term profit only. 
0 The improvement of innovation and management skills should be 
highlighted. 
" Flexible human resource management styles and stronger incentives to 
learn and imitate should be advocated by SOEs especially. 
0 Managers in indigenous Chinese firms should participate in foreign 
trade to get in touch with the newest technology in the world. 
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On the other hand, there should be sufficient policy support provided by 
Chinese government to promote FDI linkage. As illustrated in Chapter 4, by 
adjusting policy portfolio host government does be able to influence the 
behaviour of foreign firms' in the host country. But it should be emphasised that 
the influence could vary significantly from country to country, very much 
depending on the capability of the host government. There is extremely little 
that we can expect weak - or predatory - government can do to influence FIE 
activities or assist local suppliers. But how policy interventions may influence 
technology transfer and spillovers? This may be done by attracting more foreign 
investment; by ensuring an appropriate selection of FIE investments; and by 
developing local capabilities and absorptive capacities, so that the local firms 
can take advantage of the links with foreign investors. 
Before moving onto discussing the FDI Linkage promoting practice, the 
following section will provide a brief historic review of China's FDI policies. 
5.4.2 A Historic Review of China's Policy towards FDI 
The history of China's policy toward FDI is one of careful experimentation 
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and management in an attempt to use FDI to simultaneously develop an 
export-led and import substitution strategy. The decentralized nature of Chinese 
administration has meant that some of these centrifugal tendencies have 
undermined certain aspects of the regulatory process. Over time, however, as the 
low-wage export-led strategy has run its limit, and as the Chinese government 
has broadened its liberalization strategy, China has attempted to attract a 
broader array of FDI, including joint ventures to serve the Chinese market. At 
the same time, the sources of investment have evolved from the Chinese Diaspora 
to a broader set of countries, including those in the U. S., Europe and Japan. 
At the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress in July 1979, a 
joint ventures law was passed, granting foreign investment a legal status in China 
(Chen, 1996). In this initial period FDI was restricted to joint ventures in China's 
four special economic zones (SEZs) at the time (three in Guangdong province 
across the sea from Hong Kong (Shenzhen, Zhuhai (contiguous with Macao), and 
Shantou, and the fourth, Xiamen in Fujian Province, on the other side of the 
Straits of Taiwan) (World Bank, 1994). SEZs offered significant freedoms and 
advantages for foreign investors, including concessionary tax policies, exemption 
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from export duties and import duties for equipment, instruments, and apparatus 
for producing export products, and an easing of entry and exit formalities (Chen, 
1997b). Pressure from other localities led the State Council in 1984 to extend 
economic freedoms similar to those of the SEZs to 14 additional "open" coastal 
cities, and in 1985 to the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas as well as to a larger 
proportion of Fujian (World Bank, 1992). 
Specific encouragement of FDI really began in 1986, with passage of the 
Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law, which, in addition to permitting wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises, also reduced fees for labour and land use, established 
a limited foreign currency exchange market for joint ventures, and extended the 
maximum duration of a joint-venture agreement beyond 50 years (Chen, 1996; 
Huang, 1998). These policy initiatives coincided with a broadening of the reach 
of China's Open Door Policy to include the entire coastal zone in 1988, a shift that 
became known as China's coastal development strategy. Open policies for FDI 
now extended to the entire coastal region, stressing two main goals: (1) to 
develop labour-intensive industry in the coastal area; (2) to base the production 
of these industries in labour intensive export processing of imported raw 
183 
materials (Chen, 1997d). 
The next watershed came in 1992, when Deng Xiaoping gave his now famous 
"Spring Wind" speech endorsing continued market reforms and rapid growth in 
the context of a post-Tiananmen conservative backlash (Shirk, 1994), and the 
size of FDI flows into China soon accelerated, especially from industrialized 
countries. It was also at this time that the Chinese domestic market became more 
open to foreign firms (Cheng and Kwan, 2000), certainly a strong incentive for 
developed source countries trying to get around China's strict import controls. 
There was somewhat of a rollback on FDI liberalization in 1994, primarily to cool 
an overheating economy and discourage FDI in real estate (Cheng and Kwan, 
2000), but when the economy cooled down liberalization continued. In recent 
years, FDI policy has also focused on encouraging technologically-intensive 
investment, as authorities have begun treating FDI as a means for acquiring 
foreign technology versus importing complete sets of advanced equipment 
(UNCTAD, 2000). 
Since the mid-1990s, China's policy towards FDI can be at least partly 
evaluated in terms of its desire to join the World Trade Organization. This desire 
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can help to explain the Chinese Government's attempt to rollback some of the 
special privileges for foreign investors. The idea is that as authorities reduce 
tariffs, they will also reduce preferential treatment for foreign-invested 
enterprises (FIEs), but preferential income tax treatment is expected to continue 
(Chen, 1996). In that spirit the Chinese government announced the removal of 
duty-free status on capital goods imports by FIEs to begin in April 1996, a 
measure that was heavily qualified by grandfather clauses. Partly as a result, FDI 
fell off in 1996-97, and successful lobbying by FIES as well as provincial officials 
eager for FDI is having some effect: it has since been announced that previous 
exemptions, such as exemption from import duties and value-added taxes on 
imports of equipment, have been restored (Henley, Kirkpatrick and Wilde, 1999; 
UNCTAD, 1999). 
In sum, China's policy towards FDI was clearly designed to encourage 
export-oriented FDI, looking externally to draw on both inputs and markets, and 
granting well-defined freedoms and incentives to the FIE sector. Policymakers, 
by developing the coastal development strategy that afforded SEZ-like privileges 
to the entire coast of China, created a kind of gigantic export processing zone, 
185 
where free markets were defined not so much by geography but more by 
ownership (Naughton, 1996). It is also important to note that these liberalizing 
policies were in line with the government's own import substitution strategies, 
where FIEs and the limited free market in which they operated were largely 
separate from the centrally planned and inward oriented sector (Kueh, 1992). It 
is only recently as the size of the foreign-invested sector has continued to grow 
and sell to the domestic market that it has begun to exert important influences 
throughout the wider economy. 
5.4.3 Linkage and Supplier Development Policies 
As concluded through current research, to maximise the benefit from FDI 
and pursue the long term development of local economy, Chinese government 
needs to reconsider and to adjust their policy portfolio to the new reality. 
The policies that are under consideration here are those that promote the 
creation of new backward linkages as well as the deepening and upgrading of 
existing linkages with the ultimate aim of upgrading the capabilities of local 
suppliers. They consist in fostering and supporting dense networks of suppliers 
186 
who can reliably deliver high-quality, low-cost parts and components. By doing 
this formerly import-intensive import-substitution industrialisation 
(ISI)-assembly industries as well as import-intensive export-oriented 
industrialisation (EOI)-assembly industries could be deepened. Owing to the 
shift to export-oriented industrialisation and the more opening of the economies 
in many developing countries, the focus is increasingly on local firms that serve 
as suppliers to export-oriented assemblers. Such policies must also address 
information and co-ordination problems, because it is not obvious that 
individual assembly companies (often i\ NC subsidiaries or joint ventures) by 
themselves organise local procurement networks encompassing domestic 
suppliers. 
Linkage and supplier development policies must be seen in combination 
with related policy fields, in particular FDI promotion policies and local firm 
development policies. The objective of linkage and supplier development policies 
is to promote willing FIEs, capable local firms and effective linkages between 
them. 
0 First, China needs to attract foreign investors and in particular 
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investors that have a large linkage potential and/or it needs to upgrade 
existing FIE activities so that they are more conducive to linkage 
formation. 
As proved in Chapter 3, inward FDI flows do not automatically result in 
dense backward linkages. The decision to source locally from domestic suppliers 
depends on a variety of factors. First, the presence of reliable and flexible local 
suppliers that can meet the requirements of buyers (cost, quality and timely 
delivery) is of crucial importance for linkage formation. The technological and ' 
managerial gap between foreign firms and local supplier enterprises is often 
referred to as the main obstacle for efficient backward linkage formation in 
developing countries. Second, even when efficient local suppliers are not present, 
FIEs may look for potential domestic suppliers and assist them in improving 
their capabilities. Third, some industries have a larger linkage potential than 
others. Linkages are typically low in process industries and high in industries 
where the production process is divisible into multi-stage activities using a 
variety of materials, components and parts. Fourth, market position and 
technological sophistication are important. FIEs in price-sensitive market 
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segments are more footloose and thus less likely to `invest' in local 
embeddedness. Similarly, FIEs producing very specialised and advanced 
products have fewer processes and products to outsource in a developing 
country context. Fifth, corporate strategies matter. FIEs in the same industry 
may source their inputs differently. Domestic-market-oriented FIEs have 
generally more local links to suppliers than export-oriented FIES but the links 
between the latter and local suppliers may be more efficient and competitive. 
Further local sourcing varies according to the home country and corporate 
culture, so that European, American and Japanese FIEs display differences in 
their sourcing behaviour. There may even be considerable differences among 
affiliates from the same country. Finally, local procurement also seems to be 
influenced by the size of affiliates, by the degree of affiliate autonomy, by the 
length of operation in the host country and by regional trade agreements 
(Battat et al., 1996; Dicken, 1998; UNCTAD, 2001a; Altenburg, 2002). 
0 Second, policies should aim at expanding the local supplier base by 
preparing them for partnerships and by supporting potential domestic 
supplier firms in such areas as technology upgrading, training and 
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financing so that they can exploit such partnerships to their own 
advantage. 
Mutual self-interest and strong commitment of both parties as well as time 
may lead to formation of developmental linkages if the capability gaps are not 
too wide. Yet, policy and institutional support are needed to foster a wide base 
of capable suppliers, and policies can affect both the terms of local procurement 
and the willingness of FIEs to transfer knowledge and skills to local suppliers. 
0 Third, policies can enhance linkages and support technology transfer 
from affiliates to local suppliers (Altenburg, 2002). 
Policy-makers may develop specific linkage policies by using `harder' 
command and control measures or by using `softer' policy instruments giving 
particular incentives or promoting co-operation efforts. The traditional linkage 
policies were mostly of the former mandatory kind. Thus, many developing 
countries have set high tariffs on imports on parts and components, and 
imposed local content requirements (LCRs) on FIEs with the aim of expanding 
local procurement and strengthening domestic supplier industries. However, 
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these measures did not necessarily promote local procurement because FIEs 
could also choose to internalise input production or source input from foreign 
suppliers located in the host country. In addition, more liberal investment rules 
and restrictions on the trade-related investment measures have undermined the 
LCR instrument (Battat et al., 1996; UNCTAD, 2001a). 
As backward linkages no longer can be forced upon FIES, `softer' policy 
instruments should be considered by Chinese government. Promotion of 
co-operation is an often-used policy instrument. Many countries have 
introduced information provision and matchmaking services. The former 
consist of various kinds of data banks, listing potential partners for 
subcontracting, while the latter goes a step further organising seminars, factory 
visits and follow-up initiatives. Such matchmaking services could be conducted 
either by public officials or by consultants from private firms/private 
associations. Moreover, industrial estate policies may be organised so as to 
cluster supporting enterprises near large-scale assemblers. Finally, a range of 
policy measures that rest on economic incentives for FIEs could be helpful as 
well. Some countries have introduced tax incentives to promote backward 
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linkages. Others utilise special credit and guarantee schemes, subsidies or 
privileged public procurement to induce FIEs to give special training and 
technical assistance to their suppliers. 
The above mentioned policy measures that focus predominantly on the 
extent of linkages are technical in orientation and tend to present linkages in a 
benign manner - reciprocity and co-operation. However, linkages are also about 
asymmetry, stratification and power. This aspect has been forcefully addressed in 
the FIE debate. Besides studying the circumstances under which one can 
expect FIEs to utilise local sourcing of inputs rather than import, FIE critiques 
have pointed to the quality of such linkages. One criticism being that FIES tend 
to procure only inferior or low-level inputs (packing, simple components, 
cleaning services etc. ) from domestic suppliers. Another being that 
subcontracting may have more or less beneficial effects on the supplier firm (in 
relation to earnings, risk sharing, continuity in orders, and transfer of product 
and process know-how) depending on the rationale behind subcontracting and 
the power relations between suppliers and principals. Therefore, linkage policy 
must also encompass the quality of supplier linkages. 
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5.4.4 From Policy Formulation to Policy Implementation 
Policy content and policy instruments are one matter, policy choice, policy 
design and policy implementation are another. Policy choice is often constrained 
by the structural power of leading social groups and the organisational 
structure of the state but is also the result of the play of political forces and 
interests. Formulation of a coherent policy and the translation of policy 
objectives effectively into policy outputs and further on to outcomes is a 
complicated matter. Thus to generate a successful process from policy 
formulation over policy implementation to policy impact with specific reference 
to linkage and supplier development policies, the following issues have to be 
aware of. 
First, it should be acknowledged that though the space for policy 
intervention has become more limited with the introduction of a new 
international policy framework (trade-related investment measures, TR. IMs), 
there is still scope for pro-active linkage policies if policy-makers manage to use 
the options allowed within this framework. Specific linkage policy is one such 
measure. To be effective there must be `a vision' about supplier development 
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through backward linkages, and this vision should be built upon a strong 
political commitment and be shared among all stakeholders. Further, it should 
be based on a clear, realistic and detailed understanding of the level of supplier 
development in China, of the needs of FIEs, of the scope of the windows of 
opportunity, and of the policy measures that will work in the particular context. 
In order to create stakeholder credibility, a medium/long-term policy 
perspective is required. Therefore, constantly shifting policy priorities may 
constitute a problem. 
Second, and related, policies have to take into account the broader 
development strategies, the economic environment and the institutional setting 
in China. As far as policy coherence is concerned, linkage and supplier 
development policies have to be consistent with broader policies, such as FDI 
policies, technology policies, skill development policies and competition policies. 
FDI policies are of special importance; those which attract `developmental' 
foreign investors with a high linkage potential or which affect upgrading of 
existing affiliates have direct relations with linkage formation. Finally, the 
broader economic policies and incentive environment must not undermine the 
194 
strategic use of backward linkages for supplier upgrading or work to the 
detriment of local firms. If policies generally discriminate against local firms; if 
tax policies include sales taxes that are levied on the full value of the products so 
that they have a cascading effect (not found in value added taxing systems); if 
investment promotion policies favour global suppliers, or if the overall business 
and incentive environment work against supplier development, it will be 
extremely difficult to successfully implement linkage policies or local firm 
development policies more broadly. 
Third, and related, there is generally a strong need for well-conceived and 
coordinated linkage policies. Such policies must take the following into 
consideration: selecting a target group with a realistic potential for becoming 
suppliers; focusing on the most capable and committed domestic enterprises; 
avoiding support to suppliers that are assisted by large-scale assemblers anyway 
or supporting only additional assistance from the principal; avoiding assistance 
to local firms that are unaware of their problems - and thus unprepared for 
changing their business; and avoiding assistance to principal-subcontractor 
arrangements of a highly asymmetric and short-term nature. 
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Fourth, the institutional framework for policy formulation and implemen- 
tation must be in place. Though semi-public organisations may perform much 
of the practical implementation, a relatively autonomous. and strong co- 
ordinating agency is an important prerequisite for co-ordinated programming. 
When more ministries and agencies are involved contradictory initiatives arise, 
just as functional duplication and conflicting lines of authority often result in 
`blocking', inconsistency in implementation or `side-tracking' during the process of 
implementation. As a range of intermediate supporting institutions are involved 
there will thus be a strong call for coordination both at the level of 
programming and at the level of actual service delivery. Furthermore, policy 
failure tends to prevail if weak, low-status agencies staffed with a few, poorly 
paid and inexperienced officials are responsible for the actual implementation. 
Fifth, public-private networks are needed in the process of policy design as 
well as in policy implementation. Linkage and supplier development is a 
complicated process, and in order to be effective in influencing the pace and 
direction of this process, the state must strongly involve the two other partners 
in the `linkage triangle'. In relation to the FIEs, the point of departure must be 
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that they only participate if there are tangible or other benefits for them and if 
a close collaboration is established. In relation to the suppliers, high awareness 
and certain capabilities must be in place or be created. Suppliers may more 
easily be approached if they have organised themselves collectively and this 
may also strengthen their bargaining position VS FIEs (cf. the asymmetric 
power issue). In relation to local firms as would-be suppliers, the involved 
agencies must - in order to understand clients' changing needs and provide 
relevant services - maintain a close contact with clients (individual 
firms/networking firms). 
Finally, in relation to the policy impact, it should be noted that even well- 
designed and well-implemented policy and institutional support might not have 
the expected impact. A global downturn, new modes of organisation of the 
AINC business or better investment opportunities and cheaper suppliers 
elsewhere may work against linkage formation, just as, for example, tax evasion 
considerations may keep potential suppliers (local firms) at a certain distance 
from the state and its support agencies. It may also be that even with supplier 
development support or local firm assistance programmes most/many local 
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suppliers (e. g. former domestic-market-oriented local suppliers) cannot live up 
to the required lower prices, higher standards, higher product quality and faster 
delivery. Therefore, due to structural forces they are - despite policy initiatives 
- replaced by import and/or foreign suppliers located in China. 
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5.5 Limitations and Future Research Agenda 
There are at least two main topics that deserve further research to conduct 
upon: 
" More research is needed enabling a better understanding to be shared a 
propos the effect of FDI on host countries. In particular, as far as the 
study in Chapter 2 is concerned, it would be useful to verify the findings 
by using data that allow for disclosing identification of individual firms 
as suppliers to multinationals rather than relying on an input-output 
table to measure interactions between sectors. 
" While the theoretical model in Chapter 4 provides some interesting 
insights, it does make some compelling assumptions. In particular, the 
interaction among local suppliers can not be brought in to the scene 
since only one local supplier is designed in the model. Thus the model 
can be extended to allow for multiple local suppliers, and I speculate 
that the main conclusions would remain valid under such a setting. 
In addition, the other sourcing choices of in-house production and local 
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sourcing from locally based FIEs are ruled out. Recall that in Chapter 3 
I point out the possible four options for FIEs to source input: importing, 
in-house production, local sourcing from locally based FIEs or 
indigenous suppliers. Therefore, recognising all sourcing options of FIES 
would be another standpoint of future research. 
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Appendix 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
It would be greatly appreciated if you could complete the following 
questionnaire and return it to: 
Liaison Office 
Henan Provincial Department of Commerce 
41 Jingsan Road 
Zhengzhou 
450003 
1. Name and professional address of respondent (optional) 
2. Share of your input sourcing from indigenous Chinese firm out of the total 
input sourcing. 
2003 
2004 
2005 
3. Share of your input sourcing from foreign firms in China out of the total 
input sourcing. 
2003 
2004 
2005 
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